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In June of 2012 Camargo Corrêa, the Brazilian Family Group that controlled the 
Brazilian cement producer InterCement, acquired 61% of the Portuguese cement 
production leader, Cimpor, with an offer price of 5.5 Euros, allowing Camargo Corrêa to 
take full control of Cimpor by owning 94% of the company.  
Cement is an industry characterized by huge production scales and high initial 
investments, with an enduring trend of consolidation among cement’s biggest 
international producers, and this deal comes at the tail-end of the 2008 financial crisis, 
which marked the European macroeconomic environment, particularly the sovereign 
treasury of the PIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain).  
According to the model used in this work, Cimpor’s share price at the time of the 
acquisition announcement is found to be undervalued, with 14.8% upside potential. 
Moreover, adding the forecasted synergies to the model implies a fair offer price of 6.14 
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The focus of this dissertation is on Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). Its goal is to 
analyze the deal between Camargo Corrêa and Cimpor in June of 2012 and to present the 
possible financial and strategic reasons that may have justified it. 
First of all, this work will begin with a deep analysis of the current academic literature 
concerning valuation issues and frameworks. Additionally, still in the same section, I will 
address other issues concerning some M&A trends and this deal in particular. Therefore, 
the literature review will provide the theoretical foundation to the work that will then 
follow. 
Secondly, the most important features of the cement industry as a whole, and of 
Cimpor and InterCement in particular will be addressed, with particular emphasis on the 
consolidation trend that is currently driving the industry and on the companies’ historical 
financials. 
With these two sections serving as a base, I will present a model to value both 
companies, as well as the merged one (with and without synergies), with the proper 
fundamentals. This work will devote special attention to revenues forecasts as well as to 
the computation of the discount rates that will be used. Having presented the model, the 
work will bring numbers to the table when providing enterprise values, market 
capitalizations and share prices both for the standalone companies and for the merged 
one. The focus, however, will be on Cimpor’s valuation with and without synergies, since 
it is the most important issue to be analyzed and discussed in this deal. 
I will end with a comparison between the values implied by the model used and those 
that featured this deal, as well as with other analysts’ valuations; I will also analyze the 
underlying strategies and financial incentives behind this deal, and will finish with a 
general conclusion trying to summarize all the relevant issues regarding this acquisition. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
As Damodaran (2006) puts it "Valuation lies at the heart of much of what we do in 
finance", albeit it is not rocket science. In fact, Carabias and Fernández (2006) argue that 
valuations are more built on opinions than on scientific facts because they are conditioned 
by the set of expectations of whoever is conducting them. Moreover, Young’s et al. 
(1999), “all roads lead to Rome” means that the final result obtained by different valuation 
approaches may actually be the same, while in turn, the choice of the model is the result 
of one's decision about which aspects to make clear and which ones to obscure. 
Due to the vastness of existing research on valuation, it is wiser to summarize and 
separate the main methodologies in four (with a variety of derivations) (Damodaran, 
2006): Discounted Cash Flows (DCF); asset-based valuations; contingent claim 
valuations and relative valuations. In this work, I will only address DCF and relative 
valuations, both because they are the most commonly used and also due to the existing 
extensive literature about them.  
 
2.1. Discounted Cash Flow Approach 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methods comprise two possible approaches: the equity 
one ─ where the dividend stream is the basis for the valuation ─ and the firm one ─ which 
values the business as a whole (enterprise value). In this work I will focus only on the 
latter, since I believe it is more pertinent to first value the whole company and only then 
separate between the firm's market capitalization and its debt value.  
Damodaran (2006) states that in order to estimate the value of an asset, one should 
calculate its cash flows’ present values and to obtain the value of the entire business 
forecasting the Free Cash Flows to the Firm (FCFF) is the more appropriate approach: 
Operating Income (EBIT) 
- Normalized tax on EBIT 
= NOPAT (EBIAT) 
+ Depreciations and Amortizations 
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- Investments in Working Capita 
- Capital Expenditures 
=Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
The DCF model is a function of the forecast it relies on. Thus the appropriateness of 
using this method depends on how accurately the cash flow projections and risk measures 
are calculated, and of how real the assumptions are when computing the cost of capital. 
This is why errors in estimating Return on Invested Capital (ROIC), growth rates and 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) can sometimes lead to severe errors in 
valuation (Goedhart, Moller and Wessels, 2005). 
Having said that, there have been several debates on whether to use DCF or relative 
valuations when valuing a company. Within this discussion range, Kaplan and Ruback 
(1996) compared the DCF model with the Multiples’ method using High Leverage 
Transactions (HTLs)1 and concluded that DCF’s estimates “were ‘clustered’ more tightly 
around the actual values”.  
 
2.1.1. Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
The DCF model implies that future cash flows be discounted according to their 
riskiness, which consequently is the same as saying that they should be discounted using 
a rate that describes the “opportunity cost of investing capital in assets of similar risk and 
duration” (Kester and Morley, 1997). 
In order to calculate this opportunity cost of the business, one needs to first estimate 
the required rates of return for debt and equity, and then weight them with each’s 
respective proportional claims before adding the two components together. As a result, 
WACC is the most common tool to discount the future cash flows of a firm according to 
its capital structure, and it will be the tool used in this work. The formula can be displayed 
as follows: 
 
                                                 
1 The use of HLTs in the study is based on the fact that in this type of transactions the participants are 
required to make detailed cash flow projections public. 
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𝑊𝐴𝐶𝐶 = 𝑅𝐸 ×  
𝐸
𝐷 + 𝐸
+ 𝑅𝐷 ×  
𝐷
𝐷 + 𝐸
 × (1 − 𝑇𝑐) 
 
2.1.2. Capital Asset Pricing Model 
Although there are several methods to calculate the cost of equity of a project, the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) tends to be the one that generally gathers more 
consensus. CAPM is a model that specifies expected returns for use in capital budgeting, 
valuation, and regulation, and considers risk premium on an individual security as a 
function of it systematic risk, measured by the covariance with the market.  
However, some authors disagree on the latter. In fact, in their 1992 well-known study, 
Fama and French (1992) argued that stock returns were correlated with firm size and 
book-to-market rations instead of with measures of systematic risk, as the CAPM implies.  
On the other hand, Kaplan’s and Ruback’s study (1996) valued the HLTs’ cash flows 
using a discount rate based on CAPM and their work can be viewed as a test to this model. 
Contrary to Fama and French, they concluded that the implied risk premium was 
positively related to firm and industry betas. It is important to repeat that this study was 
based on HLTs mostly because their participants were required to disclose their own cash 
flow projections, which gives some robustness to the model in question. 
To conclude, and taking into account what was already said in this section, I will use 
CAPM to calculate the cost of equity. Its computation requires the use of a risk-free rate, 
a “beta” and a risk premium. 
 
2.1.2.1. Risk-Free Rate 
A risk-free investment implies, first of all, its actual returns to be equal to its expected 
returns, and secondly, that there is no reinvestment risk associated with it (Damodaran, 
2008). Although the theoretical importance of the second condition cannot be ignored, its 
practical application seldom makes any difference in the final value. Notwithstanding, it 
is advisable that the duration of the risk free asset matches the duration of the cash flows 
being analyzed. As a result, for long-run projects, 10-Year government bond rates seem 
to be the most appropriate to discount these project’s cash flows. 
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However, special attention is necessary if long-term, traded government bonds are not 
available for a specific currency. This being the case, a different currency should be use 
or, if possible, risk-free rates from forward markets should be estimated.  
Regarding the first suggestion, if one choses to use the risk-free rate of the mature 
market long-term government bond, the cash flows have to be converted to the respective 
currency. This is done by estimating future exchange rates. 
When it comes to convert the local discount rate to the foreign one, the formula is the 
following: 
 
𝑅𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 = (1 + 𝑅𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦) ×
1 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
1 + 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
− 1 
 
In addition, when there is a default risk associated with a certain government bond, the 
rate that should be used must be net of the default spread2. As in this work it will be 
possible to estimate future exchange rates, cash flows from foreign projects will be 
converted to the local currency on a yearly basis. 
 
2.1.2.2. Risk Premium 
Damodaran states that “the expected return on any investment can be written as the 
sum of the risk-free rate and an extra return to compensate for the risk”.  The most 
common method to estimate the latter, known as equity risk premium, is the use of 
historical premium earned by stocks over default-free securities throughout long periods 
of time in mature markets (Damodaran, 2008). However, some issues still rise in 
contemporary literature regarding the use of this method. The first one concerns how far 
backward analysts should go in choosing a time frame to retrieve the historical risk 
premium from - the less the number of years taken into account, the more update 
estimations will be, albeit at the same time registering larger standard errors. Furthermore, 
to compute the premium, the risk free rate chosen must be consistent with the one used 
                                                 
2 Typically the default spreads for bounds are associated with the respective sovereign rating classes. 
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to compute expected returns. The last issue regarding the use of historical premiums is 
whether to use arithmetic or geometric averages.  
Having in mind testing whether the use of the arithmetic average historical risk 
premium was appropriate, Kaplan and Ruback (1996) “inverted” the DCF analysis to 
come up with an implied discount rate (i.e., the discount rate that would make the DCF 
forecasts yield the exact transaction value). The value they came up with was 7.8% in the 
median case, which is significantly close to the historical arithmetic average risk premium 
(7.4%). Taking this study into consideration, I will use the arithmetic average when 
computing the historical risk premium. 
There is, however, a problem when estimating the risk premium for emerging markets 
due its short and volatile data. Damodaran gathered historical risk premiums for major 
non-United States (US) markets and concluded that some countries had risk premiums 
below 1%, and in some cases even negative ones. Consequently, and has historical 
premiums for emerging markets are not valid when applying risk models, the approach 
to be used has to include the country risk premium: 
Assuming that the degree of exposure to the country risk is equal to the degree of 
exposure to systematic risk (Damodaran, 2008), this country risk premium would simply 
be added to the original equity risk premium. 
 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 = 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 + 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 
 
Considering the US equity market as a mature one, one can gather sufficient historical 
data to make a correct estimate of the risk premium. Then, through estimations of country 
premiums available on Damodaran website it is possible to compute a foreign project’s 
total equity risk premium. 
 
2.1.2.3. Beta 
CAPM implies the estimation of a “beta” (B) which is a measure of the risk that a 
certain investment adds to the market portfolio (Damodaran, 2002). An asset’s beta can 
be estimated through two different methods: the first one consists in regressing the returns 
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on an asset against the returns of an index representing the market portfolio. Different 
choices of a Market Index, time period, and return interval may result in different beta 
values for the same asset.  
Despite all this issues, the most important one concerns the fact that this beta 
estimation is based upon historical data, thus not taking into account firm’s changing 
features over time, particularly when recent leverage changes have occurred. 
The second method consists in using the average beta for the industry since market 
expectations are already included in it. Damodaran (2002) suggests the use of Bottom-
Up Betas, which takes into account the updated degrees of operating and financial 
leverage. Plus, it assumes that if all of the firm’s risk is borne by the stockholders, the 
beta of debt is zero. Therefore, to estimate the unlevered beta for the business the firm is 
involved in, Copeland et al. (2000) recommend using the published estimates of the 
unlevered beta for the industry – which already includes market expectations. Assuming 
that the relative risk of firms is similar across markets, one is allowed to use bottom-up 
betas for companies in the same business in the United States (Damodaran, 2002). In 
addition, by assuming that all firms in a sector have the same operating leverage one can 
directly use these betas without adjusting for eventual differences between the average 
firm in the industry and the firm being valued. 





2.1.3. Cost of Debt 
The cost of debt is used to calculate the cost of debt financing for a certain project 
(Damodaran, 2006). It is computed adding the risk-free rate to the company’s default 
spread (related to the company default risk). In order to estimate the latter, Damodaran 
(2002) proposes linking the interest coverage ratio3 and the financial rating. Additionally, 
to use the cost debt in the WACC calculation, one needs to know the market value of 
debt. Brigharm and Ehrhardt (2011) state that “if the company’s debt is not publicly 
traded, then it is reasonable to use the book value of debt” because “book and market 
                                                 
3 The interest coverage ratio is used to access how easily or not is a company able to pay interest on its 
outstanding debt. Usually, the ratio is EBIT / Interest Payments. 
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values of debt are usually close to one another”. However, such method cannot be used 
if the company has debt trading in the market in the form of bonds. 
 
2.1.4. Terminal Value 
The terminal value of a project represents a significant part of its present value and 
always has to be included (Kester and Morley, 1997). Before computing the terminal 
value, the length of the forecasting time frame must be calculated. Then, assuming that 
the last periods’ cash flows will be generated as a growing perpetuity is the most 
appropriate method regarding concerns with the indefinite life of the project (Ohlson and 
Zhan, 1999).  
The growth rate to be applied should determine the annuity requirements for working 
capital and investment. Steiger (2008) stressed that the terminal growth rate should be 
similar to the nominal GDP growth, since in the long-run a company is not expected to 
grow faster than the country’s economy where it has its business. Also, during the stable 
stage of the business capital expenditures (CAPEX) should be equal to depreciations and 
amortizations (D&A) (Kaplan and Ruback, 1996). Finally, since the final enterprise value 
is mostly driven by WACC and the terminal growth rate, sensitivity analysis are often 
recommended.  
Some argue that, because the perpetuity method depends too much on the growth rate 
used, applying an EBITDA multiple to the last year EBITDA is more advisable. However, 
according to Kapan and Ruback (1996), “by using the cash flows forecast over the 
forecast period and then applying the current EBITDA multiple at the end of the period, 
the hybrid approach effectively double-counts the higher growth during the forecast 
period”. 
 
2.1.5. Adjusted Present Value 
Although only the WACC method is going to be used in this work, one cannot ignore 
the existence of its main alternative: according to Luehrman (1997), “Adjusted Present 
Value works when WACC does, and sometimes when WACC doesn’t, because it requires 
fewer restrictive assumptions”. The main assumption when applying the WACC method 
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is a constant ratio of debt to total capital. Although it is possible to recalculate the WACC 
for every period taking into account the leverage evolution, this work is difficult and 
tedious and it may generate some confusion regarding where the value of the company is 
coming from.  
In addition, the weights attributed to equity and debt when computing WACC are 
based on their market values. Luehrman emphasizes this issue by saying that “if we knew 
the true market value of the assets, we wouldn’t need to do the analysis in the first place”. 
Having this in mind, one could say that APV is a better tool when addressing the origin 
of value creation, as it distinguishes between the value of the project alone and the 
inherent financing side effects: 
𝐴𝑃𝑉 = 𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒4 + Value of all Financing Side Effects5 
If on the one hand it is rather consensual that APV is a better method when the 
companies are highly levered and their financial structure is projected to vary 
significantly during the forecasted periods, the same does not apply when choosing which 
rate to use to discount the financial effects’ cash flows. 
By using APV, one ensures that the discount rates only contains the time value of 
money (risk-free rate of interest) and a risk premium (according to the riskiness of the 
cash flows being discounted). Any other value generated by financial maneuvers (e.g. tax 
savings, risk management, etc.) has its own cash flow consequences.  
The reason behind the use of WACC instead of APV is the assumption of a constant 
leverage ratio in the forecasted time period, for both companies, which makes APV 
useless for valuation purposes in this work. 
 
2.2. Multiples 
As stated earlier, in addition to DCF, I will also use the multiples’ approach which, 
instead of relying on forecasts, requires a look at how the company’s peers are valued by 
the market. However, two conditions must be verified for the sake of accuracy: the 
comparable companies used should bear the same level of risk and should have similar 
                                                 
4 Value of the project as if it was financed entirely with equity. 
5 Interest Tax Shields, Cost of Financial Distress, Subsidies, Hedges, Issue Costs, Other Costs. 
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expectations for growth and Return on Invested Capital (ROIC). Secondly, one has to 
assume that the value of the company varies in the same direction and proportion as the 
performance measure (i.e., if expected Net Income increases by 5%, expected value also 
rises by 5%). 
If these assumptions are valid and these conditions fulfilled, the multiples approach 
will prove to be a more rigorous measure of value, since the multiple itself already 
incorporates updated market expectations of future cash flows and discount rates (Kaplan 
and Ruback, 1996). 
In addition, it is still possible to divide these multiples in two types: market and 
transaction (Vernimmen 2005). The market one has its focus on a sample of comparable 
companies, while the transaction one is based on a sample of past company transactions. 
Furthermore, according to Damadoran, one can also separate the market multiples based 
on their fundamental determinants:  
 
Table 1: Fundamentals determining equity multiples (Damodaran, 2006) 
Multiple Fundamental Determinants 
Price to Earnings Ratio Expected Growth, Payout, Risk 
Price to Book Equity Ratio Expected Growth, Payout, Risk, ROE 
Price to Sales Ratio Expected Growth, Payout, Risk, Net 
Margin 
EV to EBITDA Expected Growth, Reinvestment Rate, 
Risk, ROC, Tax rate 
EV to Capital Ratio Expected Growth, Reinvestment Rate, 
Risk, Roc 
EV to Sales Expected Growth, Reinvestment Rate, 
Risk, Operating Margin 
 
With so many multiples to choose from, Goedhart, Koller and Wessels (2005) 
highlight main two points to follow when valuing a company: 
The use of individual companies’ multiples – since the average industry ignores the 
fact that even though companies belong to the same business area, their growth rates, 
ROIC and capital structures may vary drastically; 
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The use of Enterprise-value multiples instead of Market Capitalization ones – since 
the latter are systematically affected by capital structure.  
The most common type, P/E, includes many nonoperating items, which are also very 
specific to each individual company. EV/EBITDA is the most recommended not only 
because it is less susceptible to variations in the capital structure, but also because it does 
not take into consideration nonoperating expenses. The P/Sales assumes that the 
companies chosen have the same operating margins as the one being valued. PEG is 
similar to the P/E multiple, except it adjusts for the different growth expectations across 
companies. However, it still has all the other limitations as the P/E multiple. 
In conclusion, although the multiples method poses a very good valuation method,  the 
choice between it and the DCF approach depends on “whether the benefits of using firm-
specific information in the DCF method are greater than the costs of ignoring the 
contemporaneous measures of market expectations contained in the comparable 
methods” (Kaplam and Ruback, 1996). However, one should not forget that an integrated 
analysis comprising both DCF and multiples valuation “can hold useful discussions about 
whether the company is strategically positioned to create more value than other industry 
players” and also “generate insights into the key factors creating value in an industry” 
(Goedhart et al., 2005). 
 
2.3. Synergy 
According to Damodaran (2005), synergy is the “additional value that is generated by 
combining two firms, creating opportunities that would not have been available to these 
firms operating independently”. 
There are two types of synergies: operating synergies and financial synergies. 
Operating synergies include economies of scale (mainly through cost savings, usually 
resulting from horizontal mergers, which are the most reliable source of synergy), 
stronger pricing power (due to reduced competition and higher market share), 
combination of different functional strengths and higher growth in new or existing 
markets. These type of synergies affect the value of the firms involved in a merger or 
acquisition by affecting margins, returns and growth. 
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Financial synergies, on the other hand, can influence not only the cash flows, but also 
the cost of capital: a combination between a firm with excess cash and a firm with high-
return projections but scarce cash can generate synergies – the value of these synergies 
would be the projects that a firm with high-return projections would set aside due to not 
having sufficient money to finance them. If the cash flows of the combined firm become 
more stable and predictable, the debt capacity of the new firm is expected to increase. In 
addition, Lewellen (1971) states that these benefits should be analyzed in terms of 
reduced default risk. Tax benefits may be gained by taking advantage of tax laws to write 
up the acquired company’s assets or from using its net operating losses to smooth income. 
At last, diversification is often doubted because investors in the firms can diversify on 
their own, thus firm diversification should not generate any value creation. 
Synergies can be calculated by forecasting the cash flows of the combining firm, 
discounting them at the appropriate rate (i.e., respective to the new firm and not to the 
acquirer/target one) and then subtracting the sum of the two standalone companies before 
the merger takes place. After calculated, these synergies must be split between the 
acquiring and the acquired firms according to the share of unique strengths that contribute 
to these synergies. For instance, if costs savings are available in other peer group firms 
besides the acquiring one, the target shareholders would be “likely to receive a larger 
share of the benefits” (Damodaran, 2005). 
The history around synergy sharing allows us to conclude that almost all of the synergy 
value goes to the acquired firm’s shareholders (Jensen and Ruback, 1983). As a result, it 
is not surprising that the most common error when valuing synergy is providing items or 
strengths to the target firm’s stockholders that these stockholders had no role in creating. 
Notwithstanding, a study from Boston Consulting Group showed that sellers collect, on 
average, 31 percent of the average capitalized value of expected synergies. 
In sum, it is important to distinguish between the value of synergy and the value of 
control in order not to incur in double-counting errors: the value of control is the 
incremental value of the target firm assuming a new and better governance by the new 
management team. This value should be attributable to the acquiring firm shareholders, 
since they are the only ones who contribute to this value creation.  
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2.4. Other Issues 
2.4.1. Mergers and Acquisitions’ Implied Strategies 
The categorization of a Merger and Acquisition (M&A) deal depends on the strategic 
intent that underlies it. According to Bowler (2001), “M&A actually represent very (five) 
different strategic activities”, these being: overcapacity, geographic roll-up, 
product/market extension, M&A as R&D and industry convergence. 
Overcapacity M&A is the most common one6 and it usually occurs when an industry 
is at its maturity stage in its life-cycle and thus tending to consolidation. The main goals 
underlying this strategy are elimination of excess capacity, a bigger market share and 
more efficient operation by closing less competitive facilities, elimination of less effective 
managers and rationalization of administrative processes. The biggest issue with this type 
of merger is the cultural clash between the participants, since both are well-established 
large companies that have their processes and values deeply entrenched. The geographic 
roll-up M&A occurs when two firms in the same geographically fragmented industries 
merge, usually in an early stage of the industry’s life cycle. The product/market extension 
M&A consists of the extension of a company into new markets or products, thus 
increasing its international coverage or its product line. The M&A as R&D is usually used 
in the presence of companies producing products with short life cycles and which 
production requires fast high-tech developments – in these scenarios, acquisitions are 
used in lieu of in-house R&D to quickly build a market position. Finally, the industry 
convergence M&A takes place when the eroding boundaries between two industries act 
as an incentive for a company to acquire another, thus creating a new pioneer in this new 
industry. 
 
2.4.2. Cross-Border Valuation 
Since the early 1990s, the relaxation of capital controls, elimination of barriers to trade, 
European economic integrations and the economic opening and growth of emerging 
countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America enabled the beginning of 
                                                 
6 It accounts for 37% of the M&A deals in the breakdown of the article “Not All M&As Are Alike – 
and That Matters”. 
 
22                                             Miguel Andrade                       M&A: The Case of Cimpor and InterCement 
 
mergers and acquisitions between companies around the world, thus leading to the 
strengthening of the globalization7 trend (Kester and Morley, 1997). 
The current crisis had a negative impact in the GDP growth in the USA and in the 
majority of the developed countries in Europe. The stagnation of their local economies 
hampered the development of several business in these countries, which forced 
companies to expand themselves to emerging markets in order to look for more growth 
opportunities. On the other hand, having in mind the need to reduce “sovereign exposure”, 
emerging-markets firms soon began to diversify their business through the purchase of 
foreign assets (especially developed-market assets) (Zennet, Mathews, Marks and Mago, 
2008).  
Nevertheless, despite the growth of free-market based economies, there are still some 
forces hindering cross-border transactions, namely protectionist sentiments: for instance, 
the existence of “national champions” may result in some resilience by the local 
governments to sell them to foreign entities.  
 
2.4.3. Geographic Diversification and Multi-Nationality 
Although literature about the relationship between multi-nationality and firm 
performance has mostly rejected the hypothesis of being positively correlated, Driffields, 
Du and Girma (2005) proved that, after controlling for firm level and industry factors, 
that relationship is positive. 
The benefits of geographic diversification are significant, and one of them is the 
protection against exchange rate swings, and faster responses to changes in local demands 
(Barlett and Ghoshal, 1986). Kogut (1985), Benvignati (1987), Grant (1987), Gomes and 
Ramaswamy (1999) and Contractor (2003) have also argued for several others advantages 
inherent to multi-nationality such as dampening the impact of domestic business 
fluctuations by using foreign market outlets, taking advantage of factor cost differentials 
across multiple locations and greater geographic dispersion which facilitates the 
                                                 
7 “Globalization is the increasing inter-connectedness of people and places as a result of advances in 
transport, communication, and information technologies.” (Zennet, Mathews, Marks and Mago, 2008). 
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undertaking of domestic ventures that are high-risk but also highly profitable. In addition, 
firms with low tech requirements are able to choose between a larger set of host countries 
where they want to expand to. 
Finally, it is important to explain why most of the literature on this subject does not 
consider positive the relationship between geographic diversification and firm 
performance: one factor suggested by Dfriffields, Du and Girma (2005) is that some firm 
exposure to specific countries may take time to pay-off, and due to the short time series 
and small samples available, these hypothetical pay-offs did not have the time to appear, 
thus hampering their inclusion in previous studies. 
 
2.4.4. Fire-Sale 
Krugman (2000) argues that “foreign acquisitions of target firms from crisis countries 
surge amid a financial crisis” and that “these target firms are sold at prices below 
fundamental values”. Wetizel, Kling and Gerritsen (2014) test the fire-sale hypothesis for 
the European financial crisis and conclude that “countries affected by a crisis attract 
foreign buyers selling assets at a discount”. One critical example is the sale of Portuguese 
assets to Swiss and French companies, which was also influenced by the fact that the 
Troika demanded Portugal to sell €5bn of state companies as part of the deal from which 
the country received a €78bn bailout in May 2011. 
 
2.4.5. Market for Corporate Control 
According to Fama (1980) there is a market for corporate control if one assumes 
financial markets are efficient. As a consequence, if a company underperforms, that will 
jeopardize its value and consequently its shareholders will see their wealth decreased. In 
line with this rational, this market can be described as an external mechanism, composed 
by firms and individuals who buy equity positions in potentially undervalued 
corporations, that is activated in the event of failure of a firm’s internal control (Hit et. al, 
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2.4.6. Cash vs. Stock 
Despite having covered several issues regarding valuation, there is still need to 
mention the different payment methods acquirers can chose from when buying another 
company: cash offers and stock offers. While the first one is a simple trade In between 
shares and cash, the second requires the acquirer to offer their shares as a way of payment 
for the respective target shares. Rappaport and Sirower (1999) state that the main 
distinction between the two methods is how the risks and the potential benefits are shared: 
in a cash offer all the risks and expected synergies are borne by the buyer while in the 
stock transaction the target is also allowed to profit for the potential synergies, as well as 
to share the inherent risks.  
However, other criteria aside from this risk/return analysis may be used. In fact, the 
acquirer assessment of whether its shares are overvalued or not plays an important role in 
the decision making, as the buyer will be more prone to a stock transaction if he believes 
its shares are overvalued. 
Finally, Rianda (n.d.) states that “if the purchaser is privately held, the ability to sell 
any shares in the company is very limited” since it is difficult to find buyers willing to 
purchase those shares. 
 
 
3. Industry Review 
 
3.1. Intro to Cement 
Cement is considered to be the main input of the building industry. Within this sector, 
cement can be used in different segments of heavy building, house construction, and 
construction services. Given its importance, one could then argue that analyzing the 
evolution of cement's demand means analyzing the evolution of the building industry 
itself which, in turn, is highly subjected to economic cycles (namely the construction and 
building materials industry): it grows sedately in mature economies and faster in 
developing countries. This makes cement producers and their respective shareholders 
highly exposed to the volatility of their returns. 
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As far as competition is concerned, there is not a straightforward substitute of cement. 
It is a homogeneous product, which as a result does not allow for product differentiation. 
Instead, companies in this industry try to overcome competition through prices and 
operational efficiency. 
 
3.2. Production Process 
Cement is produced mostly from limestone and clay in a roughly 5:1 weight 
proportion; for each ton of cement 1.4 ton of limestone are needed. For this reason, and 
also to reduce transportation costs, factories are often located near limestone’s fields. As 
far as clay goes, it is relatively easy to find it in the nature. 
Besides limestone and clay, the other main necessary inputs to produce cement are: 
energy – which represents the largest (40% on average) variable cost; water – 100 liters 
per ton of cement; additions – which provide a significant reduction in CO2 emissions; 
and fuel – which, as some other raw materials, has been recently substituted by residues.  
 
 
3.3. Scale and Production Costs 
Forge is the most important production input in the cement industry. It is inside the 
forge that the most vital transformation of all the cement production process takes place. 
Given the chemical feature of the process, there is a small interval between a minimum 
and a maximum quantity at which the forge is able to produce within a determined 
efficiency pattern. This makes the cement production extremely vulnerable to market 
fluctuations, as it is directly dependent on the forge’s capacity. 
Cement demands a significant cost of entry as the construction of a new plant costs 
around US$200 per ton of capacity. This brings about three main issues: first of all, it 
results in a high minimum efficiency scale – which has been growing in the last decades, 
as companies have been driven to periodically invest in the enlargement of their scale in 
order to increase productivity and face competition; secondly, the difficulty companies 
have in incrementing marginal productivity, since increases of supply occur through huge 
jumps in quantity produced, being  these supply increases conditioned by an expected 
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usage of at least thirty years ; finally, the strong weight of fixed costs in the production 
of cement allows for the extremely costly existence of idle capacity in the industry. 
 
3.4. Prices 
Cement features, already described, make its transportation through long distances 
extremely expensive. As a result, its prices are determined locally – allowing for a big 
difference between cement prices in different regions of the word - according to four 
variables: population growth, GDP per capita, degree of competition and capacity 
utilization rates. 
The first two determine the volumes consumed within each country. The degree of 
competition is highly influenced by the business scale, already mentioned, since it creates 
great advantages for the players already established in the market, while at the same time 
acting as significant entry barriers for beginners (as the amount of capital required to enter 
in this industry is considerably high). Finally, as far as capacity utilization rate is 
concerned, if the volumes sold are not in line with the ones expected when new capacity 
was built, prices usually decrease to face the supply/demand inbalance, failing to keep 
pace with cost inflation and sometimes reaching levels below the average costs.  
The following graphs show predictions concerning utilization rates and cement prices’ 
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Graph I: Global Capacity Utilization Rate
World ex-China Emerging markets ex-China
Source: ICR Research; Global cement 2014 outlook
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Table I: Cement Price Change Ex-Inflation YoY 
  2012  2013E  2014E  2015E  2016E  2017E  
Western Europe 1,0% -1,3% -1,0% 0,1% 0,2% 0,0% 
Eastern Europe -1,0% -1,2% -0,2% -0,7% 0,5% 0,0% 
Former Soviet Union 8,2% -2,3% -1,1% -0,2% 0,9% 0,0% 
North America 0,9% 3,0% 1,5% 2,2% 1,7% 0,9% 
Latin America 0,6% -2,7% 0,7% 0,3% 0,1% 0,0% 
MENA -1,8% -0,4% -2,3% -0,7% 0,4% 0,0% 
Sub-Saharan Africa -2,0% -3,9% -1,4% -1,5% -0,2% 0,0% 
China -18,5% -3,1% 1,2% 0,5% -0,5% -0,5% 
India 1,7% -11,1% 0,1% 2,0% 2,4% 0,0% 
North Asia 6,2% -0,7% -0,4% -0,2% 0,0% 0,0% 
South Asia -2,3% -3,0% -1,2% -0,8% 0,0% -0,1% 
Australia/Pacific -1,3% -2,4% -1,5% -1,1% -0,5% 0,0% 
World (ex-China) 0,6% -2,9% -0,8% 0,0% 0,7% 0,0% 
 
 
3.5. Intro to Brazil Market 
The evolution of the cement industry in Brazil has been driven by the development of 
the country's production forces and its' increasing integration in the international markets. 
The different cement consumption cycles are connected with the economic and 
demographic growth, while investments are related both with the consolidation and 
diversification of the main firms in the country and with the capital inflows coming from 
the main developed markets. 
The government support of the country’s industrialization enabled the main local 
economic agents to diversify their business and apply resources to the cement sector, 
which in turn led to a decrease in the importance of foreign capital in Brazil. 
Consequently, strategic investments in new plants were made, the current ones were 
modernized and companies began to merge and to acquire competitors; this shaped the 
industry into an oligopoly, with fewer groups being responsible for considerable portions 
of the national market, under the lead of local business communities (e.g. Ermírio de 
Moraes, Camargo Corrêa e João Santos). However, the interchange between periods of 
consumption and periods of stagnation, together with the intensification of the 
oligopolistic fights, led the main national groups such as Votorantim and Camargo Corrêa 
to diversify their playing fields, through more acquisitions, new investments and 
partnerships abroad. 
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The recent local consumption development has been intensifying oligopolistic 
competition inside the country namely through investments from the main already 
installed foreign players (e.g., Lafarge and Holcim) and entrance attempts by other 
important global producers (e.g., Cemex, Titan). Thus, the expected actions of the main 
local companies in the medium run concern investments aimed at ensuring the possession 
of local market shares and attempts to take advantage of the increase in local 
consumption, by challenging both locally the main international firms established in 
Brazil and globally the ones present in markets where Brazilian groups have already 
invested in. 
 
3.6. Intro to European Union Market 
3.6.1. Europe 
By the end of 2010, EU27 countries were still facing a decrease in the production of 
cement: excluding Turkey, the drop in production was – 5.4%, which followed a 
downward trend of -20% in the previous year, and the fact that only eleven out of twenty-
eight countries had experienced a positive trend. This drop was mainly caused by the 
decrease in domestic demand, which can also explain the drop in imports by -6.7%, albeit 
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Graph II: Cement Production in CEMBUREAU and EU27 Countries 
 
 




The tight financial conditions and the additional consolidation measures needed in 
order to meet the demanding fiscal targets resulted in a deceleration of all the domestic 
demand components, especially private consumption. In addition, some measures, 
including the suspension of some public work projects, were specifically aimed at 
reducing public spending. All of this had negative consequences in the construction 
sector, as the sector’s activity fell -6.5% in 2010 followed by -5% in 2011. 
 
3.6.3. Spain 
Gigh unemployment rates and credit restrictions caused by the economic crisis 
affected both construction enterprises and consumers. By the end of 2010, there was a 
decrease in investment in public civil engineering works and a delay in the completion of 
public and private projects as the local government’s special investment plan for building 
construction was put to an end. Furthermore, the housing subsidies were cut, which meant 
no more tax reductions for house purchases and for annual mortgage payments.  
Figure 1: Evolution of Cement Consumption in CEMBUREAU countries 
(%Variation 2010/2009) 
 
                        Source: CEMBUREAU Activity Report 2010 
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3.7. Intro to Emerging Markets 
Contrary to what happened with developed countries, most of the emerging economies 
are still on the rising part of the cement consumption bell curve, suggesting that 
consumption per capita tends to rise in early stages of economic development and ceases 
to do so when GDP per capita reaches advanced levels (Figure2). However, the future 
path is expected to be both more moderate and sustainable. 
Figure 2: Cement Consumption per capita vs GDP 
 
Source: Industry and national sources, CEMBUREAU, Global Cement Report, IMF, 
Morgan Stanleu Research 
Figure 3: Development of Global Cement Volumes Between 2006 and 2011 
 
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates 
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3.8. Volumes Sold, Revenues, Biggest Players and Trends 
3.8.1. Production by Region and Biggest Players 
In the year 2010, total cement production around the world was 3.3 billion tons, with 
China representing more than half of this number. Excluding China, the top main 






















Graph III: 2010 World Cement Production










Graph IV: World Ranking by Cement Capacity
mt
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates from company data
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3.8.2. Crisis and Post-Crisis 
Unless the paradigm has shifted, recovery will follow slump. World Bank forecasts 
showed GDP growth in developed world at 2.2% in 2011, followed by growth rates of 
2.6% to 2.7% in 2012-13, with developing nations growing at 6.3% in 2011-2013. 
During the crisis, while emerging markets were mostly stable with some growth, 
developed markets saw catastrophic reversals. Overall, the estimated decline for cement 
prices was around 15% in the 2009-10 periods. The costs eased initially, but then rose 
steadily through 2010, and at the moment are growing more than 30% yearly. All of this 
had a negative impact in the supply/demand balance, leading to overcapacity in a number 
of markets including emerging ones, with drops below 60% in Europe and USA. 
Several people in the business world argue that there is an opportunity in adversity (i.e. 
in periods of crisis), as managers seek out to eliminate waste and reconfigure the shape 
of the business. In times like these, CEOs of cement companies begin to give priority to 
effective cash management and preservation of Free Cash Flows by reducing 
maintenance and operational improvement projects, cutting growth initiatives (organic 
and acquisitions) and tightening working capital. In addition, SG&A and revenue-driven 
costs are reduced, as well as targeted debt (i.e. deleveraging), through restructuring and 
issue of equity. 
Generally, main indicators show that the industry is in a mature stage of development, 
where growth expectations exist, although lower than in pre-crisis years. The global 
industry revenue is slowing, with CAGR of 7.3% in 2005-10 and expected 5.3% for the 
years 2010-2015. The industry is now expected to be driven by increasing competition, 
with more and more firms focusing on cost-cutting as a way of remaining competitive. 
Brazil should continue to expand, albeit there are risks after the World Cup preparation. 
In the MENA8 region, one should observe better trends mainly since Egypt and Morocco 
are now recovering from past drops. Sub-Saharan Africa should be the fastest growing 
region during the next years given the still very low levels of cement use. 
 
                                                 
8 Set of countries belonging to the Middle East and North regions of Africa. The biggest ones are Ehypt, 
Iraq, Israel, United Arab Emirates, Morocco, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Argelia. 
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3.8.3. Globalization and Consolidation 
Worldwide cement production is characterized by the presence of big business groups, 
most of them with family property origins, who have operations spread across several 
countries. 
A significant process of consolidation in the global cement industry has been running 
its course since the mid-1980s. At the same time family-run and state-owned firms have 
been put up for sale and a few MNCs have been on a buying spree – moving aggressively 
into new markets and expanding to markets where they had previously operated. Without 
taking China into account, the combined production share of the world’s six largest firms9 
is 44% at the moment, up from 25% in 200010. 
Eastern Europe was the first region to verify a burst of acquisition activity, after the 
collapse of communism in the early 1990s and the privatization spree that ensued. This 
was followed by a merger and acquisitions surge in Latin America, as one-third of total 
capacity changed ownership between 1994 and 1999. In Asia, as a consequence of the 
financial crisis, from 1998 onwards many foreign-currency debt-laden Asian 
manufacturers sold off their assets to larger global enterprises. Finally, in the 
Mediterranean European countries, the combined capacity share of the six largest 
companies went up to 48% in 2000 from 33% in 1993. Still in Europe, of the twenty firms 
operating in France in 1970, just four of them remained operating in 2000. 
More recently, players from emerging markets are becoming more ambitious and 
starting to influence the business landscape. They are playing an increasingly large part 
in the current M&A trend and in the sector’s capacity expansion. Well established and 
rational cement producers are expected to increase their returns in emerging markets via 
consolidation.  
This trend towards consolidation has structural reasons behind it: the tendency of 
growing production scales mentioned earlier is one of causes of concentration in the 
supply structure in the global cement industry, since the initial investment cost is 
becoming bigger and bigger. 
                                                 
9 Holderbank, Lafarge, Cemex, Heidelberger, Taiheiyo, Italcementi. 
10 It was 23% in 1995 and 14% in 1985. 
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Besides scale, being transnational also plays an important role in valuation, as both 
generate economies of scale, reduce cyclicality and lower volatility of earnings. In 
addition, size is also able to bring benefits in terms of reduced cost of capital. Thus, 
mergers and acquisitions not only bring about multiple synergies and huge cost reduction 
benefits, but are also the fastest route to growth. 
 
3.8.4. Speculative Bubble in the Brazilian Residential Real-Estate Market 
The heavy building industry is connected with the real-estate market. Consequently, 
any development in the latter would significantly affect the former. Fears of a bubble in 
the Brazilian real-estate market have been subject to rumors. According to Oliveira & 
Almeida (2014), the dramatic increase in Brazil’s house prices lead to “speculative 
bubbles in the residential real estate market for the two main Brazilian cities, São Paulo 
and Rio de Janeiro, during the recent years”.  
 
 
4. Companies’ Description 
 
The industry review section showed that cement is an extremely homogeneous product 
and that there is practically no margin for differentiation. Both Cimpor and InterCement 
are driven by the same types of volumes, prices and cost pressures. In addition, their 
businesses focus on the sale of cement and clinker (which is the most profitable product 
in the industry), and on concrete and aggregates at a lower level regarding revenues and 
margins influence. Cement companies can be differentiated based in the markets they are 
exposed to, their degree of leverage, the operational efficiency and their shareholder 
structure. Since the first have already been addressed in the previous section, I will focus 
on market exposure, operational efficiency and financial and shareholder structure when 
describing Cimpor and InterCement main features. 
 
 




With its headquarters in Portugal, Cimpor lies amongst the top ten biggest cement 
groups operating globally, and it ranks 7th in Europe. The 26 factories with 16 cement 
millings have currently an installed production capacity of 36.5 million tons of cement 
per year. 
Cimpor operates in Portugal, Spain, Cabo Verde, Brazil, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, 
Turkey, Mozambique, South Africa, China and India, employing around 8.250 workers 
of 33 nationalities. Approximately 60% of Cimpor’s EBITDA derives from Brazil, 
Portugal and South Africa. In addition, Cimpor produces and commercializes concrete, 
aggregates and mortars, as a result of a vertical integration strategy, albeit it is less 
vertically integrated than groups such as Lafarge, Cemex, HeidelbergCement and 
Holcim. Moreover, Cimpor still makes most of its revenues in cement. 
Figure 4: Cimpor Sales Breakdown (2011) 
 
                                         Source: Cimpor, Exane BNP Paribas estimates 
 
 































Graph V: Cimpor EBITDA Breakdown by Country (2011)























Graph VI: Installed Capacity Breakdown by Country (2011)
Source: 2011 Annual Report
 




From 2006 to 2009, Cimpor’s ambitious acquisitions and capex program resulted in a 
45% increased capacity, mainly in India, Turkey, Latin America, Canary Islands and 
China. 
Figure 4: Cimpor cement capacity evolution since 2002 
 


























Graph VII: Contribution to Revenues (2011)
Source: 2011 Annual Report
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Due to the financial crisis, in 2009 and 2010, Cimpor’s strategy was characterized by 
investment restrictions to consolidate solid financials and gain credit in the markets. 
Following this strategic slowdown, in 2011 Cimpor returned to a sustainable growth plan, 
with significant investments aimed at achieving increased capacity, operational 
efficiency, environmental conditions and safety. Consequently, net operating investments 




Despite the external financial and economic context, Cimpor’s main financials 
remained strong between 2009 and 2011. Its recognition as an emerging markets’ 
company, its exposure to these growing economies, the reduced presence in Europe and 
the fact that it is not present in the United States of America justify the important 
advantage over its competitors, especially regarding operational return. This has allowed 
Cimpor not only to keep the highest EBITDA margin among international cement 


























Graph VIII: EBITDA and EBITDA Margins
EBITDA EBITDA margin Source: 2011 Annual Report
€M 
 





In what concerns the financial structure, Cimpor has been delivering its D/V ratio, 
mostly because of the unfavorable economic climate. This change in the debt structure 
contributed significantly to the fact that Cimpor has kept a stable rating in spite of the 





















Graph IX: EBITDA Margins per Company


















Graph X: Evolution of Revenues (CAGR 2006-2011)
x
= 2011 Revenues (Bn€)
Source: 2011 Annual Report
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Figure 5: Rating Evolution (Dec 2010 – Dec 2011) 
 
Source: 2011 annual report 
 
Within a context of great instability in the capital markets, particularly in the Eurozone, 
Cimpor’s share price increase of 4.9% in 2011 has clearly contrasted with the drops of 
28% of the Portugal’s Index, 14% of Nest100 and 36% of its industry peers. 
Figure 6: Stocks’ price evolution 
 
  Source: 2011 annual report 
Overall, one can say that the key factors of success of Cimpor are its operational 
efficiency, its market exposure and its low degree of indebtedness. 
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4.1.3. Shareholder Structure 
Cimpor’s shareholder structure is very small, with five shareholders controlling the 






InterCement Participações S.A. is a holding company formed by InterCement Brazil, 
a firm present in the business of producing and distributing cement, concrete and 
aggregates, and by Loma Negra, an Argentine cement producer. InterCement Brazil and 
Loma Negra have alignment of business areas and standardized procedures. At the 
beginning of 2012, InterCement Brazil was the third largest cement producer in the 
country. The holding company is controlled by Camargo Corrêa Group, which also holds 













Graph XI: Cimpor's Shareholder Structure
Source: 2011 Cimport Annual Report
 




With an installed capacity of 16 million metric tons of cement a year, InterCement is 
one of the biggest players in Latin America. The company sold 12.7 million metric tons 
of cement in 2011, 6.4 of which accounted for the Brazilian market, where it holds a 10% 
market share, and 6.1 for the Argentinian market, where the firm has the market 



















Graph XII: Brazil Cement Industry - Market Shares
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Following an international expansion strategy, in 2011 InterCement announced 
investments of US $ 400 million aimed at expanding its facilities in Argentina.  
Moreover, strong domestic economies with high consumption rates together with 
programs aimed at stimulating the construction and housing sectors as well as large 
infrastructure works have led to the growth of the cement industry in emerging markets, 
where Brazil holds a highlight position. In order to take advantage of these opportunities 
for growth, since 2005 InterCement has invested over R$ 8 billion in organic growth 
projects and in acquisitions. 
 
4.2.2. Financials 
As a consequence of InterCement’s total exposure to Latin America, its EBITDA has 
been growing for the past five years, with significant EBITDA margins around 25%. 
Furthermore, the company achieved record sales in 2011 as 12.6 million tons were sold, 
up 9.1% over 2010. Despite the positive outlook of InterCement’s operational 
performance, the financial structure of its controlling group is highly leveraged, with a 
D/V ratio of 0.61, which is reflected by a BB rating assigned by the rating agencies. 
 
Overall, what drives the value creation of InterCement is its operational efficiency and 
the fact that the main country were they operate – Brazil – is one of the biggest emerging 
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4.2.3. Shareholder Structure 
InterCement is 100% controlled by Camargo Corrêa, a solid family group with an 
international profile. This Brazilian conglomerate operates in twenty countries through 
six divisions: Cement, Engineering and Construction, Footwear, Textiles and Steel, 
Concessions, and Real Estate Development, Environment and Corporate. The cement one 
is represent exclusively by InterCement, which accounts for 33% of the group EBITDA 
in 2011.  
 
 
5. Companies’ Valuations 
 
Before starting to describe the methodology used in this work, it is pertinent to state 
that since the deal in question was completed on the 29th of May 2012, all the projections 
and computations will be made as if today was the first of January of 2012. All the data 
obtained was based either on what happened prior to 2012 or on what was projected to 
happen from 2012 onwards. The forecasted period will therefore start in 2012 and end in 
2017, followed by an estimation of the terminal value. 
In addition, the valuation will be made according to a Sum-of-the-Parts of all of the 
companies’ assets spread across the world, since their risk and growth profiles vary 
immensely from country to country.  
Finally, a few months after the deal was made, there was a split of assets between the 
merged company and Votorantim, as a result of anti-trust concerns regarding competition 
in Brazil. However, taking this operation into account in this valuation would not only be 
too complex, but also ineffective for the purpose of the valuation, which is to determine 
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5.1. Cimpor 
5.1.1. Installed Capacity 
 
Installed capacity is perhaps the most delicate issue in what concerns management 
decisions in the cement industry. The decision to expand capacity, thus building new 
forges, is highly dependent on an expected usage of at least thirty years, among other 
factors. The criteria used to decide whether and when to expand may yet be different from 
country to country and even from factory to factory. As a result, the model used to 
determine installed capacity simplifies what would be an extremely complex procedure, 
as it will be a function of the forecasted cement production and of the forecasted 
utilization rates. Regarding the latter, it will be assumed that Cimpor’s utilization rates 
will be in line with what is expected to happen in the industry. With expected utilization 
rates in 2017 of 72% for developed markets and 74% for emerging ones, the model 
assumes that the utilization rates of every country Cimpor operates in will gradually 
converge to these percentages in 2017.  
Mozambique and China will be exempted from this rule. Applying the rule to 
Mozambique would mean a decrease in installed capacity at the same time that volumes 
sold increase. Obviously this does not make sense, thus installed capacity in Mozambique 
will be forecasted to remain constant. As for China, its Cimpor unit has been registering 
an average utilization rate of 91% in the years prior to 2012, therefore I will assume that 
the current utilization rate (59% due to the huge investments made in the past years) will 
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Figure 7: Global capacity utilization-rate 
 
     Source: global cement 2014 outlook: ICR Research 
 
5.1.2. Revenues 
In order to determine total revenues, the model that is going to be used will assume 
three items: sales of cement and clinker, sales of concrete and aggregates, and other 
revenues. Sales of cement and clinker will be directly dependent on the total cement 
forecasted to be consumed in each country throughout the years, which will be the product 
of the total population of each country times the annual per capita cement consumption. 
To compute the latter, I used the following graphs that provide us with the cement 
consumption per capita in 2009 and its forecasts through 2050. Based on this data, the 
model assumes that each country’s cement consumption per capita converges gradually 
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Figure 8: Income and Cement Consumption Relationship (2009) 
 
Source: The Global Cement Report, BESI research 
 
Figure 9: Income and Cement Consumption Relationship (2009) 
 
 
Source: The Global Cement Report, BESI research 
 
The only modification this method will suffer will be related to such events as the 
Football World Cup and the Olympic Games meant to happen in Brazil in 2014 and 2016 
respectively. Both of these will have a positive impact on cement consumption in Brazil 
and analysts’ forecasts predict that the industry will have a CAGR of more than 9% 
between 2012 and 2017. As a result, this growth rate was taken into account when 
predicting Cimpor revenues regarding cement unit sales. 
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With each year’s cement consumption calculated for each country, the model assumes 
that Cimpor’s cement units sold will evolve in the same direction and proportion as the 
respective country’s total cement consumption, which means that it is assumed that 
Cimpor market shares will remain constant in the future. 
For each country I computed the average percentage of units of concrete and 
aggregates sold since 2007 in relation to units of cement and clinker sold in the same 
period, and used it to forecast future units of concrete and aggregates to be sold. Finally, 
the model assumes that other revenues will represent the same share of total revenues as 
they did in 2011, thus growing/decreasing at the same pace as the former. 
 
5.1.3. Prices 
Since it was impossible to find information about prices of cement and clinker, 
concrete and aggregates for each country, the model assumes that unit prices of concrete 
and aggregates are a fixed percentage of unit prices of cement and clinker across each 
country. This price relation was retrieved from the consolidated annual report. Then, for 
each country the prices were determined using an equation to equal total revenues of 2011 
to the product of the unknown prices with the known quantities. From 2011 onwards, 
prices are assumed to vary according to inflation together with the forecast price change 
ex-inflation which was presented in the Industry Review section. 
 





Despite the changes in volumes of cement sold around the countries, and although the 
economic (2008) and financial (2011) crisis had a negative impact in revenues in the 
European countries where Cimpor operates, the company was always able to keep their 
EBITDA margins constant in every country. The model assumes that there are no reasons 
to believe that this margins will change in the future, since they have been so far resistant 
to external negative forces. As a result, an average of the EBITDA margins verified 
through January 1, 2012 will be used for every country’s forecast. Similarly with the 
approach to estimate installed capacity, there are some exceptions to be made regarding 
EBITDA margins forecasts:  
In China, Cimpor managed to increase its EBITDA margin from 5.9% in 2009 to 14% 
in 2011, making it reasonable to assume it will keep improving its operational efficiency 
and reach the company’s average EBITDA margin of 23.61% by 2017. 
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Graph XV: Cimpor's Forecasted Revenues by Country (€ Millions) 
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In India, although the EBITDA margin was just 6.70% in 2011, the margin in 2009 
was 18.80%, which is reason enough to believe Cimpor can recover its healthy margins 
there by 2017. 
In Turkey, EBITDA margin increased from 10% in 2008 to 18.90% in 2011.In 2007 
the EBITDA margin was 23.70% which is an reasonable indicator that Turkey’s unit will 
be able to reach this number by 2017. 
On the other hand, it is not reasonable to believe that Spain, Portugal and Egypt will 
register past EBITDA margins when struggling to face the last consequences of the 
external economic environment present in these countries. Therefore, their margins will 
converge to the past average historical values gradually until 2017. 
In sum, while there might be some optimism regarding China, India and Turkey, one 
should not forget that the margin forecasts for the other countries were somehow 
conservative since they were calculated taking into account an average between 2007 and 
2011, which consequently included four years of world financial crisis.  
 
Table II: EBITDA Margins Historical Values and Forecasts 
 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E 2016E 2017E 
Portugal 30,7% 31,4% 33,3% 31,5% 26,3% 27,0% 27,7% 28,5% 29,2% 29,9% 30,6% 
Spain 29,3% 23,1% 14,2% 11,9% 13,9% 14,7% 15,4% 16,2% 17,0% 17,7% 18,5% 
Brazil 22,9% 25,5% 28,8% 31,3% 30,5% 27,8% 27,8% 27,8% 27,8% 27,8% 27,8% 
Egypt 48,6% 45,4% 43,4% 38,3% 30,2% 32,0% 33,9% 35,7% 37,5% 39,4% 41,2% 
Marroco 43,8% 46,1% 44,4% 44,0% 41,0% 43,9% 43,9% 43,9% 43,9% 43,9% 43,9% 
Tunísia 31,7% 26,6% 28,1% 29,8% 28,5% 28,9% 28,9% 28,9% 28,9% 28,9% 28,9% 
Turkey 23,7% 10,0% 10,3% 14,2% 18,9% 19,7% 20,5% 21,3% 22,0% 22,8% 23,6% 
Mozambique 20,6% 17,6% 14,7% 13,0% 20,6% 17,3% 17,3% 17,3% 17,3% 17,3% 17,3% 
South Africa 33,1% 33,4% 46,1% 40,7% 40,1% 38,7% 38,7% 38,7% 38,7% 38,7% 38,7% 
India 11,1% 9,7% 18,8% 9,0% 6,7% 8,7% 10,7% 12,8% 14,8% 16,8% 18,8% 
China 7,7% 9,5% 5,9% 8,4% 14,0% 15,6% 17,2% 18,8% 20,4% 22,0% 23,6% 
Cape Verde 9,7% 10,0% 12,2% 11,8% 12,6% 11,3% 11,3% 11,3% 11,3% 11,3% 11,3% 
         Source: Own calculations 
Concluding, while there might be some optimism regarding the first three exceptions, 
one should not forget that in the others the margins forecasts were somehow conservative 
since they were calculated taking into account an average between 2007 and 2011, which 
consequently included four years of world financial crisis.  
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5.1.5. Capex, D&A and Working Capital 
In order to predict working capital investments for the following years I used an 
average of working capital as a percentage of sales of the past years for each country 
where Cimpor has its business. As for Depreciations and CAPEX a more complex 
approach is needed: 
First of all, I used the company data regarding Fixed Tangible Assets (including 
Accumulated Depreciations) between 2008 and 2011 and broke the respective values per 
country according to the installed capacity of each one. Then, in order to compute 
Depreciations I used the following formula: 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑥 = 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑥−1 × 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
 
To calculate the Depreciation Rate I used the historical values to come out with an 
implied rate that was applied across all assets in every country. However, since using this 
same Depreciation rate in China would result in Depreciations being bigger than 
EBITDA, for this country the model assumes the local historical values of Depreciations. 
As mentioned in a previous section, Installed Capacity and consequently CAPEX are 
the most delicate issues, especially because of the influence the latter as on the valuation. 
As a result, I did not find it reasonable to apply some fixed percentage to every country, 
since maintenance and investment costs vary a lot across them. Instead, I used an ‘if 
scenario’ taking into consideration the company’s investment plans, its historical CAPEX 
needs and other announcements made at the time, for every specific country where 
Cimpor operates. This approach was applied as follows: 
If installed capacity has been stable/decreasing and forecasted to be stable/decreasing 
in the future, then I could assume CAPEX was related to maintenance expenses and apply 
a fixed rate based on historical values to the forecasted values of installed capacity, always 
taking each country’s inflation into account. 
If installed capacity has been growing and is projected to continue growing, then 
CAPEX was related to both maintenance and CAPEX and the same approach (based on 
historical values) was applied. The only thing this second method fails to consider is the 
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difference between maintenance costs and investment costs, however it was not possible 
to obtain that type of information for each country specifically.   
If none of the former scenarios applied or if there were investment plans associated 
with a particular country, then individual approaches were used: 
In Morocco, a new plant was projected to be built in 2012. As the model was already 
forecasting increases in installed capacity and thus in CAPEX, what I did was to retrieve 
20% of CAPEX of 2013-2017 and add it to CAPEX of 2012. The rational is that this new 
plant is being built to face the increase in capacity of the coming years. 
In Mozambique, installed capacity decreased between 2007 and 2009, increased 
between 2009 and 2011, and is estimated to remain stable in the coming years. As a 
consequence, I assumed that only the CAPEX relative to 2007 concerned maintenance 
expenditures, as the one for 2008 is presumed to contain investments associated with the 
increase in installed capacity predicted for the following 3 years. 
In China, the historical values used to calculate the rate to predict future CAPEX were 
those relative to 2010 and 2011, since prior to those years huge investments were made 
to allow for an increase in installed capacity of around 200%, and the increase in installed 
capacity that the model predicts is smoother. 
 
5.1.6. WACC 
As explained in the literature review, I will use the Discounted Cash Flow approach 
for valuation purposes, WACC as the rate to discount the Free Cash Flows to the Firm 
and CAPM to estimate the cost of equity.  
Consequently, one needs to know which risk-free rate to use. Taking into consideration 
all the issues regarding the financial crisis impacting Europe at the time and the fact that 
Cimpor’s headquarters were based in Portugal, in the Eurozone, the most appropriate 10 
year government bond to be used is the German one, since at the time there were rumors 
about the probabilities of default of some of European countries. This bond yield quote 
on 2nd January 2012 was 1.89%. Notwithstanding, it is important to say that the use of a 
local risk-free rate for discounting foreign cash flows implies that those have to be 
discounting every year to the local currency (i.e., Euro). 
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Further, the equity risk premium will comprise both the base premium for mature 
equity market and the country premium. The first one will be computed as an average of 
the arithmetic averages available in Damodaran website (i.e., 1928-2013; 1964-2013; 
2004-2013), which is 5%. Still through Damodaran website, it is possible to access each 
country’s risk premium as of June 2012. 
Then, in order to compute the Beta, the unlevered Beta for the construction industry 
was retrieved from Damodaran website as well, which allowed for the calculation of the 
levered Beta for Cimpor using the formula present in the literature review. As such, the 
model will use a beta of 0.75 for Cimpor’ cost of capital computation. 
At the time, Cimpor had a BBB rating, implying a spread of 2%, which results in a 
cost of debt of 3.89%. Further, the model assumes the degree of leverage of 34%. This 
assumption is based upon two factors: first of all, despite the external adversities Cimpor 
managed to decrease its leverage over the previous years, which allows us to assume it 
can manage its future operations without needing to issue more debt. Finally, the different 
WACCs computed for each country are based on the market capitalization of 3 377 
Million Euros, and in the debt book value of 1 623 Million Euros. Per the literature 
review, the book value can be considered the same as the market value since none of the 
companies has debt trading in the market. 
  
5.1.7. Terminal Value 
The growth rates applied to the different countries where Cimpor operates (plus 
Argentina, were InterCement also operates) were based on the PwC forecasts of GDP per 
country through 2060 - from where I computed the CAGR of each country GDP until 
2060, using them as the terminal growth rates. This method was according to the 
suggestion in the literature about terminal growth rates needing to be in line with the 








Figure 10: Income and Cement Consumption Relationship (2010) 
 
                 Source: IMF, UN and CEMBUREAU 
As I was not able to find information of forecasts for Argentina’s cement consumption 
per capita, the presumption is that it would grow at a pace between Brazil’s and South 
Africa’s, taking under consideration the fact that in 2010, consumption values were in the 
middle of these countries according to the Bell Curve. 
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5.2.2. Costs 
The model assumes that the relation between concretes’ and aggregates’ prices and 
cement’s and clinker’s is the same as in Cimpor; it also used the same method to estimate 
future EBITDA margins. 
 
5.2.3. WACC 
The same assumptions will be made regarding the risk-free rate and the conversion of 
foreign cash-flows to the Euro currency when valuing InterCement.  In addition, the 
model will use the same procedures when computing equity risk premium and the Beta. 
The cost of debt for InterCement will be higher since they have a rating of BB, which 
means its spread will be 4%. Therefore, the model will presume that the level of leverage 
InterCement had in 2011 (i.e., 44%) will be maintained in the future, and that the book 
value of equity of InterCement in 2011, considering no information was available 
regarding market capitalization of the company. 
 
5.2.4. Capex, D&A and Working Capital 
The rationale used to calculate Working Capital, CAPEX and D&A is the same that 
was applied when valuing Cimpor: the Depreciation Rate was exactly the same, while 
Working Capital and CAPEX were also based on historical values. 
 
5.3. Multiples Valuation 
In this section I will use the multiples’ to analyze how the market value Cimpor’s and 
InterCement’s peers. Then, I will compare both my DCF valuation and its implied 
multiples against the peers’ ones to see the differences and the similarities between them 
and their respective underlying reasons. 
In order to do so, one must carefully choose which multiples to use and which peers 
to choose. Having in mind what was discussed in the literature review, I will use the 
EV/EBITDA, EV /SALES and P/E multiples, with particular emphasis on  EV/EBITDA. 
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As for the choice of peers, the following table considers each of Cimpor’s and 
InterCement’s main competitors and presents information about their geographic 
exposure, degree of leverage, EBITDA margins, ROIC and historical and expected 
growth. 

















- Next 2 
years 
ROIC Geographic exposure 
CRH 52,54% 24,77 10,10 0,88 9% -6% 3% 6% Europe, North America 
Holcim  97,68% 13,60 6,37 1,32 19% -8% -2% 8% Europe, Asia, Latin America 
Italcementi 309,02% 21,06 5,05 0,81 16% -6% 1% NA Europe, North America, Africa, Asia 
HeidelbergCement 159,36% 17,44 7,01 1,24 18% -5% 5% 13% Europe, North America, Africa, Asia 
Lafarge 
215,32% 9,13 6,06 1,35 21% -4% -2% 14% 
Europe, North America, Latin 
America, Asia 
Buzzi Unicem 132,79% NA 7,20 0,90 16% -8% 5% 3% Europe, North America 
Average 161,12% 17,20 6,96 1,08 17% -6% 2% 9% - 
Cimpor 50,82% 21,38 9,66 2,62 27% 3% 5% 17% Europe, Africa, Asia, Latin America 
Premium implied    24% 39% 142%          
 
All the peers have most of their business concentrated in the production of cement, 
concrete and aggregates, allowing one to conclude that, since the business risk is roughly 
the same, the only criterion to assess the differences in risk profile between the companies 
is their geographic exposure.  
There are two main players in the cement business that were not considered in this 
analysis: Votorantim and Cemex. Votorantim only generates half of its EBITDA through 
cement activities, and operates in the USA and Brazil; besides, as a family group, 
gathering information about its activities is particularly difficult. On the other hand, 
Cemex generates almost 70% of its revenues in Mexico and the USA and 15% in Spain, 
which is not comparable to the market exposure that Cimpor has; in addition, the 
information required to make a proper multiples analysis was not available. 
Therefore, since the cement industry is characterized as an oligopoly, as previously 
discussed, with few but big players representing the supply side of the market, and thus 
being left with six peers to analyze, I have no option but to ignore the other such criteria 
as the desirable similar levels of growth and ROIC. 
As it can be observed, Cimpor has higher multiples than its peers, with the difference 
between their EV/Sales ratio being enormous; this is understandable, since as it was 
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explained in the companies’ description, Cimpor has the highest margins within all the 
industry. In addition, Cimpor’s implied EV/EBITDA is 27% higher than its peers’ 
average, which can be explained by the fact that it is more exposed to emerging and 
growing markets, thus having better growth prospects. Finally, the fact that the premium 
is smaller for the PE ratio can be justified by the potential heavy interest charges that the 
other players are facing, which results in a wide difference between their EBITDA and 
their Net Income. Overall and most importantly, Cimpor’s exposure to emerging 
countries, its low degree of leverage and its high margins are the critical factors that 
makes it more valuable than its competitors. 
As for Intercement, a multiples analysis would not provide any added value to the 
assessment made so far for three reasons: the main cement players in Brazil are 
international companies, which on its own would bias any comparison with a local player 
like Intercement; secondly, among these competitors, Intercement is the only company 
with a big exposure to the cement market in Argentina, and thus to the country’s peso 
exchange rate fluctuations, which is absorbing much of the company’s value; and finally, 
the other non-international players in Brazil and Argentina are private companies for 
which not much information is available to the public. 
 
5.4. Analysis of results obtained 
5.4.1. Cimpor 
The DCF method together with the assumptions made and previously explained 
resulted in an Enterprise Value for Cimpor of 5 496 Million Euros, and a Market 
Capitalization of 3 873 Million Euros, with a share price of 5.74 Euros. This valuation is 
higher than the company’s market price at the time (5 Euros), higher than the offer price 
made to acquire the firm (5.85 Euros), and in line with the average of other analysts’ 
valuations (average of 5.85 Euros). Regarding the market price, it is of vital importance 
to say that there might be a huge bias due to the very small free float – just 15.6% of 
Cimpor’s stake as outstanding shares – which might mean that the true equity value of 
Cimpor may be very different than the one the market implies. 
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The most complete research notes available for a proper comparison were Millenium’s 
and Santander’s, both of which used the DCF approach in conjunction with a Sum of 
Parts valuation. The following table shows mine, Santander’s and Millenium’s valuations 
for each of Cimpor’s assets: 
Table IV: Valuations Comparison  
 Thesis Millenium Santander 
 EV WACC Growth  
Rate 
EV WACC Growth  
Rate 
EV WACC Growth  
Rate 
Portugal 728 € 9,34% 1,9%          705 €  12,2% 1,5%        678 €  10,2% 1,0% 
Spain 236 € 7,95% 2,5%          470 €  10,1% 1,5%        308 €  8,2% 1,0% 
Brazil 1 565 € 7,63% 3,3%       1 710 €  14,1% 5,6%     2 163 €  8,1% 3,0% 
Egypt 466 € 11,15% 3,7%          571 €  22,3% 12,5%        302 €  11,0% 3,0% 
Marroco 567 € 8,39% 3,6%          283 €  14,7% 7,0%        289 €  10,1% 3,0% 
Tunísia 175 € 7,95% 3,5%          225 €  15,3% 7,0%        206 €  10,1% 3,0% 
Turkey 328 € 8,57% 3,9%          560 €  15,4% 6,5%        182 €  11,0% 3,0% 
Mozambique 257 € 8,40% 4,9%          160 €  25,3% 16,0%        533 €  10,1% 3,0% 
South Africa 559 € 7,12% 3,0%          420 €  13,4% 5,2%        498 €  9,8% 3,0% 
India 104 € 7,88% 4,9%          146 €  12,5% 5,4%           48 €  10,0% 3,0% 
China 462 € 6,71% 4,3%          589 €  8,7% 1,5%        186 €  8,3% 2,0% 
Cape Verde 49 € 8,47% 3,5%          162 €  - -           29 €  10,2% 2,0% 
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The main differences between my valuation and the ones by the two banks pertain 
mainly to the WACCs and terminal growth rates used. Regarding WACCs, the only 
apparent difference was the risk free rate of 2.5% used by Millenium, which is greater 
than the one used in this work (1.89%). On the one hand, the financial crisis may have 
led analysts to make an over pessimistic assessment of the general risks for Cimpor’s 
business; on the other hand, another possible explanation could be the lack of importance 
given to Cimpor’s geographic diversification and the consequent risk diversification as a 
result of its market exposure.  
As for the terminal growth rates, although I am aware of the consequences arising from 
using higher growth rates when valuing companies11 (albeit Millenium’s being even 
higher), I believe that using countries’ GDP nominal growth rates is the most coherent 
method of valuing a company’s terminal value – in the case of Cimpor, the company is 
exposed to emerging markets with the strategic purpose of taking advantage of their long-
term potential growth, which is where they can also create value, and therefore should be 
included in the growth prospects of the company. As such, I took these two elements 
under careful consideration, as a result of their significant influence in the final values, 
with the respective results presented in the following graphs12: 
 
Table IV: Sensitivity Analysis   
PRICE PER 
SHARE 
TERMINAL GROWTH RATE 





 8,76% 4,38 € 4,90 € 5,54 € 
8,23% 5,04 € 5,74 € 6,60 € 
7,69% 5,86 € 6,83 € 7,91 € 
 
There is yet another element in the valuation used in this work that differs from the 
one used by the two banks, according to whom the valuation of Cimpor’s assets in Brazil 
should be much higher. According to the model used, Santander and Millenium are being 
over optimistic about the cement industry growth in Brazil, since it is not forecasted to 
                                                 
11 Significant changes in the terminal value, and consequently in the enterprise value. 
12 Each country’s WACC and Terminal Growth Rate was increased/decreased by 0.5%. 
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grow faster than 9.2% a year (on average), even with the Football World Cup and the 
Olympic Games already included in these predictions. In addition, as mentioned in the 
industry review, there are “speculative bubbles in the residential real estate market” in 
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, which should foster some caution when making forecasts 
about the construction industry. 
 
5.4.2. InterCement 
Careful attention should be paid when considering InterCement valuation: the 
Enterprise Value of 647 Million Euros and the consequent null equity value (since the 
enterprise value is lower than the debt one) are far from what would be expected. 
Although there are no research notes to use as a comparison term to my own valuation, 
one still can look at InterCement’s book values: the assets value is significantly higher 
than what the valuation used in this work implies, and due to the debt book value of 768 
Million Euros, the equity of InterCement is worth nothing.  
Nevertheless, there is a reasonable and logical explanation supporting these values: 
while apparently there is nothing wrong with the forecasts used regarding EBITDA, 
Capex, etc…, the huge forecasted exchange rates regarding the Argentina Peso and the 
Argentina country risk absorb almost the total value that is being created by InterCement 
in that country, and that is why the overall value of the company is so much lower than 
its book value. 
 
 
6. Valuation of the Merged Entity 
 
Consistent with what was said in the literature review, the valuation of the merged 
entity that now follows implies two major steps: the first one concerns the valuation of 
the merged entity without synergies, while the second already considers the potential 
synergies in its calculations. 
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6.1. Valuation of the merged entity without synergies 
In order to value the combined entity without taking into account any potential 
synergies, I made almost all the same assumptions used to value both companies 
separately. Those that need additional explanation concern margins and cost of capital: 
the EBITDA margin used to value the combined company in Brazil is a weighted average 
between both companies which took into consideration the installed capacity of each one 
in 2011. As for the cost of capital, the financial structure considered will take into account 
an average of the companies’ levels of leverage (still based on book values), weighted 
according to the enterprise values calculated through the DCF approach. In addition, the 
spread used to calculate the cost of debt will be subjected to the same method as the 
previous item. 
The final value of 6 150 Million Euros is slightly bigger than the simple sum of both 
companies’ enterprise values (6 143 Million Euros). The explanation probably lies in the 
fact that the new computed WACCs had different impacts across the different assets, and 
not always in the same proportion. Notwithstanding, the enterprise value to be used for 
calculating synergies will be the first one, while this difference will be ignored for the 
sake of simplicity. 
 
6.2. Analysis of Synergies 
The fact that Cimpor and InterCement operate in different countries with the exception 
of Brazil, makes it illogical to find synergies between the other Cimpor and InterCement 
assets. Therefore, the only country where it makes sense to look for potential synergies is 
Brazil, where both companies operate. Regarding the combination of InterCement’s and 
Cimpor’s assets in Brazil, only one type of synergy will be considered, which will concern 
cost savings. Regarding the other possible ones: 
Although a stronger pricing power caused by the decrease in competition and by a 
market share gain could be considered an operating synergy, the fact is that in this case 
factories from both companies operate in different regions which, due to the high 
transportation costs, forces prices to be a function of a supply/demand relationship on a 
regional basis. As a result, the industrial context does not allow for gains in pricing power. 
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Less volatility in cash flows could be considered a result of a spreader market 
exposure, which would lead to a decrease in the overall risk of the business. However, 
the reality is that the one country which did not already belong to Cimpor’s ‘portfolio’ is 
Argentina which, as mentioned above, has a very high country risk. 
On the other hand, economies of scale between these companies will be obtained 
through cost savings, resulting in operating synergies. I based the estimation of this cost 
savings on three studies: the first concerns past deals in the cement industry and the 
respective realized synergies of 2-4% of target sales13; the second consists of a study from 
Boston Consulting Group around the announced synergies in the construction synergy, 
which median is of 5.6%; and finally a study of Price and Waterhouse Coopers about the 
percentage fully achieved of announced cost saving synergies, with a result of 40%. I 
assume that every one of these synergies concerns cost savings, since as it was mentioned 
in the industry review, the cement industry is not characterized by significant changes in 
companies’ market shares, thus not allowing for revenue synergies. In addition, as stated 
before, cost savings are the most reliable source of synergy. Therefore, the cost savings 
synergies will account for 2.24% of Cimpor sales in Brazil. This number is consistent 
both with synergies achieved in past deals as with the last two studies mentioned above.14 
 
 
                                                 
13 Estimation obtained from company data. 






















Graph 17: Past Deals Synergies as %Target Sales
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6.3. Synergies Sharing 
With all the synergies estimated, one still has to decide how to split them between the 
acquiring and the target companies. 
As far as cost saving synergies are concerned, per the literature review, the split of 
these synergies depends on the unique contribution of each firm to the creation of 
synergies. In this case, from Cimpor’s perspective, the cost savings provided by 
InterCement could also be obtained if it was acquired by other cement big players in 
Brazil (e.g. Votorantim, Lafarge, Holcim). However, the fact that there are not many 
players in the industry gives InterCement some uniqueness in terms of contribution to 
these synergies. Just by analyzing each companies’ contribution to the creation of these 
synergies one could say that a 50/50 split was the fairest one. Nevertheless, as explained 
before history around synergy sharing points to an average of 31% of the capitalized value 
of expected synergies collected by the target companies. Moreover, the same study related 
the percentage of synergies attributed to the target shareholders with the acquiring firm’s 
operating performance: 
 
As a result, considering that with InterCement’s average historical EBITDA margins 
of 24% placing the company above the average in what operative performance is 
concerned, one could say that the percentage of synergies that should be attributable to 









H I G H E S T  O P E R A T I V E  
P E R F O R M A N C E
L O W E S T  O P E R A T I V E  
P E R F O R M A N C E
Graph XVIII: Synergies captured by target shareholder (%)
Source: Boston Consulting Group
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35% of the synergies created by this acquisition. The following graph shows the 
synergies’ present value attributable to each company: 
 
In conclusion, the value of Cimpor with synergies according to this model is 5 765 
Million Euros. The value of the synergies expected by this combination of assets of 269 
Million Euros, is slightly lower than the one InterCement predicted when announcing the 
acquisition (330 Million Euros).  
 
 
7. The Acquisition 
 
7.1. Mode of acquisition 
On May 30, 2012, the Brazilian group Camargo Corrêa announced a Takeover Bid for 
Cimpor.  
The acquiring group already owned 33% of Cimpor, and offered €5.50 per share for 
the remainder 67%. 
The target shareholders were all present in Cimpor’s structure apart from Camargo 
Corrêa itself. Caixa Geral de Depósitos (CGD), Banco Comercial Português (BCP), 
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to sell their shares at the offered price. Votorantim, on the other hand, decided to maintain 
its 21.2% stake in Cimpor and declined the offer. 
Camargo Corrêa, the Brazilian group, was the acquiring shareholder and had the 
objective to merge InterCement’s assets with Cimpor’s.  
 
7.2. Underlying Strategy 
One cannot say that the acquisition of Cimpor by Camargo Corrêa was motivated by 
a single factor. Instead, there are several reasons that make this acquisition very 
opportunistic for the Brazilian group. All of the reasons presented below contributed 
positively to the decision, albeit probably not in the same proportion.  
 
7.2.1. Overcapacity M&A 
All of the underlying goals implied in this strategy fit in the rationale of this acquisition 
as far as the Brazilian assets are concerned. The consolidation of the Brazilian cement 
industry, together with the announced events such as the Football World Cup and the 
Olympic Games, which are predicted to boost the demand side of the industry, make the 
year 2012 the perfect time for Camargo Corrêa to acquire Cimpor, as one of the 
consequences will be the gain of a bigger market share, 18%, thus establishing itself as 
the second largest cement producer in Brazil, and allowing the group to take full 
















Graph XX: Brazil Cement Industry - Market Shares
Source: Exane BNP Paribas estimates from company data
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In addition, the elimination of excess capacity, the creation of a more efficient 
operation and the rationalization of the administrative processes inherent to these 
strategies are included in the cost saving synergies calculated in the previous section. 
Overall, and according to previous calculations, one can say that this is the best strategy 
for Camargo Corrêa to acquire more value. 
 
7.2.2. Geographic diversification 
This is an acquisition of a multinational company present in twelve countries by a local 
company operating in only two countries (Brazil and Argentina). This fact alone brings 
significant benefits to the acquiring firm. By being exposed to more countries in different 
parts of the globe, Camargo Corrêa will now be more protected against exchange rate 
swings – the Brazilian Real and the Argentina Peso are not stable currencies ─, as well 
as domestic business fluctuations. Furthermore, this geographic dispersion will allow the 
merged company to penetrate in other potential emerging markets as the risk inherent to 
the investments in these eventual new countries is backed by the presence in other already 
growing and mature markets. Finally, and as also mentioned in the literature review, firms 
in emerging markets like Brazil will benefit from a reduced “sovereign exposure” through 
the acquisition of foreign assets in developed countries, and in addition will have access 
to the financial international markets. 
 
7.2.3. Undervaluation 
As was discussed when valuing Cimpor, the DCF model used implied a much higher 
price per share than the market price at the time. Additionally, other financial institutions 
had valued Cimpor above the market price. However, the underlying strategy of taking 
advantage of an undervalued company is only valid assuming that Camargo Corrêa also 
views Cimpor as a more valuable company than what the market implies. According to 
the “market for corporate control” theory explained in the literature review, Camargo 
Corrêa would have perceived Cimpor as an undervalued company and as such – together 
with all the reasons explained above – decided to proceed with the respective acquisition.  
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In line with this rationale is the hypothesis of the existence of the Fire-Sale phenomena 
in this deal: by 2012, Portugal was immensely affected by the financial crisis. Further, 
Troika had demanded that Portugal sell €5Bn in state companies as a counterpart for the 
bailout. All of this, together with the fact that two of Cimpor’s shareholders were state 
owned – CGD and BCP – resulted in the immediate acceptance of Camargo Corrêa’s 
offer by these two entities, which did not allow enough room to renegotiate the offer price. 
In sum, it is highly likely that the Brazilian group was aware of the Portuguese 
government’s needs and took advantage of that to establish an offer price only slightly 
higher than the market one, as they knew they would not find much resistance on the 
other side of the table. 
 
7.2.4. Financial Structure 
With a debt to equity ratio of 0.48, Cimpor’s low levered financial structure came as 
an opportunity for Camargo Corrêa to decrease its overall level of indebtedness. As it can 
been seen in the following tables, the degree of leverage of the merged company reduced 
significantly compared with Camargo Corrêa’s previous one. 
Cimpor (Book Values, M€) 
Assets Liabilites 
5 000 € 3 377 € Equity 
  1 623 € Debt 
D/E 48%   
 
NewCo (Book Values, M€) 
Assets Liabilites 
6 736 € 4 345 € Equity 
  2 391 € Debt 
D/E 55%   
 
 
InterCement (Book Values, M€) 
Assets Liabilites 
1 736 € 968 € Equity 
  768 € Debt 
D/E 79%   
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7.3. The Offer Price 
The offer price of €5.5 had an implied premium of 10% if one takes into consideration 
the closing price on the day before the preliminary announcement of €5.0 per share. Per 
the explanation offered in the valuation section, the model used in this work provided a 
‘fair’ offer price of €6.14 with synergies already included. This price has a premium over 
the closing price of 23%. In addition, if one compares the premium paid in this acquisition 
with the premiums paid in previous deals in the cement industry one can conclude it is 




The offer price of 5.50 Euros implies a Transaction Value / EBITDA multiple of 8.7, 
which means a discount of 20% over the average of 10.9 of the multiples TV/EBITDA in 
past deals in the cement industry15. On the other hand, the offer price implied by my 
calculations resulted in a multiple Transaction Value / EBITDA of 9.4, which although it 
does not reach the average of past transactions, implies a lower discount in relation to the 
former (14%).Therefore, while 6.14 Euros is considerably higher when compared to the 
real offer price of 5.50 Euros, it is still a low value considering the premiums on past deal 
announcements. 
                                                 
















Graph XXI: Premiums on past deal announcements
Source: Company Data
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In conclusion, it is important to restate that the offer price of €6.14 implies a premium 
of 23% not only because the model used assumes higher synergies but also due to the 
higher valuation of Cimpor as a standalone company when compared to its market 
capitalization. 
 
7.4. Method of Payment 
Having already determined what should have been the offer price according to the 
valuations obtained in this work, one still has to decide whether to pay for the acquisition 
with stock or with cash. As discussed previously in the literature, the most frequently used 
criteria to make this type of decision relies on who should bear the risks and the benefits 
of the potential synergies. Having said that, it is important to remember that most of the 
synergies come from Cimpor’s side, with just half of the cost savings synergies resulting 
from InterCement’s participation in the deal. However, as I have already concluded, the 
offer price did not include the proper premium taking into account the potential synergies 
to be created, which might lead one to think that it would be best for Cimpor to accept a 
stock deal to benefit from these synergies in the future since these were not incorporated 
in the offer price.  
However, it was also said that the choice for the method of payment should be made 
under a risk/return rationale. In fact, there are three main issues that might lead one to 
conclude that perhaps the acquisition by stock brings more risks than future potential 
benefits for Cimpor’s shareholders: the first and main one concerns the fact that Camargo 
Corrêa is a privately held group and that will limit in a big extent the ability of Cimpor’s 
shareholder to sell Camargo Corrêa’s shares in the future. Secondly, although not taken 
into account in previous sections, the risk of assets being split in the future would 
jeopardize the value of the merged company, as it would bring a lot of uncertainty to the 
table. Finally, the Troika’s demand that the Portuguese government sell €5Bn of state 
owned companies forces in a certain way CGD and BCP to only accept cash in trade for 
their participations in Cimpor.  
To sum up, the acquisition was made with stock, and due to the lack of cash in 
Camargo Corrêa’s balance sheet, the company was forced to ask for a credit line to 
finance these operations, and consequently to lever even more its financial structure. 
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7.5. Brazilian Competition Authority 
At the time of the acquisition, and although it would result in further consolidation in 
the Brazilian cement industry, the risk of anti-trust concerns was limited, mostly because 
of the fact that on 15 May, 2012 the Brazilian anti-trust authority had approved Camargo 
Corrêa’s initial purchase of 33% of Cimpor’s stake in 2010. However, in June of that year 
concerns were raised because of Votorantim, market leader in the Brazilian cement 
industry, which had 21% stake in the merged company, making it the second largest 
cement producer in Brazil. As a consequence, and considering these concerns by the 
national antitrust authorities, Votorantim was forced to sell its stake in Cimpor. The 




The first immediate conclusion one can take from this work is the fact that the market 
undervalues Cimpor’s shares: the DCF framework used in this work implies a price per 
share – 5.74 Euros ─ significantly higher than the market price, and in addition the 
valuations made by other financial institutions seem to agree with this idea, since on 
average the analysts’ valuations of Cimpor lead to a share price of 5.85 Euros, as it is 
explained in Cimpor’s valuation section, together with the reasons to back it up. 
As far as the offer price of 5.5 Euros per share, not only does it not correspond to the 
true value of Cimpor – once again, according to my DCF analysis and to other bank’s 
valuations – but it also lacks the premium that should be in line with the potential 
synergies that are expected to arise from the deal. Furthermore, Votorantim’s refusal to 
sell its stake in Cimpor at this offer price may be viewed as additional evidence of 
undervaluation, since one can conclude that according to Votorantim, €5.5 per share was 
not the fair value of Cimpor’s shares. 
In normal circumstances, this offer price would have never been accepted by Cimpor’s 
shareholders; however, the impact the financial crisis had in the treasury accounts in 
Portugal, along with Troika’s demand to sell €5Bn of state-owned companies, resulted in 
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the acceptance of this offer by CGD and BCP, which would immediately give Cimpor’s 
control over to Camargo Corrêa. According to the model used in this work and 
considering that the offer price should have been 6.14 Euros per share, one can say that 
Cimpor’s shareholders as a whole might have lost up to 173 Million Euros with this deal, 
and state-owned shareholders could have lost up to 85 Million Euros. Cimpor was 
considered by many a Portuguese ‘national champion’ and a lot of resistance was shown 
both by the political opposition parties  as well as the public opinion, albeit these were 
not able to dissuade the government of its decision to sell its respective stake in Cimpor. 
Further, besides these undervaluation issues, while InterCement’s situation was 
improved with this deal, the same cannot be said about Cimpor: the Portuguese company 
has been able to create value to its shareholders due to its operational efficiency, its 
exposure to the right markets and its relatively low degree of indebtedness. However, the 
two latter key factors of success will now be in danger: the split of assets that was likely 
to occur at the time can potentially destroy Cimpor’s strategic market exposure, and the 
efforts made by Cimpor’s administration to deleverage its financial structure might have 
been in vain since the already indebted InterCement, together with the loans obtained to 
finance the deal, will add a huge amount of debt to the merged company financial 
structure. 
However, these risks are somehow insignificant, since in the end Camargo Corrêa 
would control 94% of Cimpor’s stake. Overall, according to all that has been said in this 
work, it was an excellent deal for the Brazilian shareholders and a bad one for Cimpor’s 
shareholders, since they could have benefited a lot more from the company value and 
from the upcoming synergies. 
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Appendix I: Population forecast per country 
Source: The Global Cement Report, BESI 
research   
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Angola 17043 17559 18076 18592 19109 19625 20197 20769 21340 21912 22484 
Argentina 41343 41761 42179 42596 43014 43432 43821 44211 44600 44990 45379 
Brazil 201103 203352 205600 207849 210097 212346 214398 216451 218503 220556 222608 
Cape Verde 509 516 524 531 539 546 553 561 568 576 583 
China 1330141 1336415 1342690 1348964 1355239 1361513 1366119 1370726 1375332 1379939 1384545 
Egypt 80472 82075 83678 85281 86884 88487 90042 91596 93151 94705 96260 
India  1173108 1188826 1204543 1220261 1235978 1251696 1266575 1281455 1296334 1311214 1326093 
Morroco 31627 31966 32305 32645 32984 33323 33650 33976 34303 34629 34956 
Mozambique 22417 22994 23571 24149 24726 25303 25963 26623 27283 27943 28603 
Paraguay 6376 6892 7409 7925 8442 6783 7355 7927 8498 9070 7192 
Portugal 10736 10754 10772 10789 10807 10825 10825 10826 10826 10826 10842 
South Africa 49109 48944 48780 48615 48451 48286 48335 48384 48432 48481 48530 
Spain 46506 46834 47162 47490 47818 48146 48520 48894 49268 49642 50016 
Tunisia 10525 10627 10730 10832 10935 11037 11128 11220 11311 11403 11494 
Turkey 77804 78748 79692 80635 81579 82523 83370 84217 85063 85910 86757 
 
 
Appendix II: Annual per capita cement consumption (kg per capita) Source: Santander / IMF   
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Argentina                 
Brazil 309 327 357 372 399 411 420 433 
Cape Verde 632 617 615 616 619 627 636 655 
China 1395 1517 1570 1601 1625 1641 1649 1666 
Egypt 635 541 514 512 512 512 514 530 
India  210 214 219 225 231 236 241 248 
Morroco 459 474 479 483 486 488 491 493 
Mozambique 50 53 57 61 63 64 65 67 
Portugal 543 457 399 359 332 315 316 316 
South Africa 219 239 244 247 250 252 254 259 
Spain 532 439 386 356 337 330 331 324 
Tunisia 701 659 633 617 622 628 634 647 
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Appendix III: Inflation (as %) Source:   IMF             
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Angola 
14,48 13,48 10,29 8,78 7,66 7,73 7,39 7,14 6,73 6,50 
Argentina 
10,46 9,78 10,04 10,62 10,99 12,00 10,44 8,88 7,32 5,76 
Brazil 
5,04 6,64 5,40 6,20 5,92 4,18 4,37 4,56 4,75 4,94 
Cape Verde 
2,08 4,47 2,54 1,51 1,75 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 
China 
3,33 5,42 2,65 2,63 3,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 2,00 
Egypt 
11,70 11,07 8,65 6,92 10,65 9,83 8,66 7,50 6,33 5,17 
India  
10,53 9,55 10,21 9,48 8,41 7,53 7,62 7,72 7,81 7,91 
Morroco 
0,99 0,91 1,29 1,88 2,50 2,50 2,50 2,50 2,50 2,50 
Mozambique 
12,70 10,35 2,09 4,21 5,60 5,60 5,60 5,60 5,60 5,60 
Paraguay 
4,65 8,25 3,68 2,68 4,72 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 5,00 
Portugal 
1,39 3,56 2,78 0,44 0,67 0,24 0,95 1,66 2,36 3,07 
South Africa 
4,27 5,00 5,65 5,75 5,98 5,95 5,60 5,25 4,90 4,55 
Spain 
2,04 3,05 2,44 1,53 0,27 0,24 0,90 1,04 1,02 1,05 
Tunisia 
4,41 3,54 5,56 6,10 5,49 5,01 4,17 4,03 4,03 4,03 
Turkey 
8,57 6,47 8,89 7,49 7,77 8,23 7,40 6,58 5,75 4,93 
 
 
Appendix IV: Exchange rates (US$)       
Source: 
IMF         
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Angola 91,91 93,93 95,47 96,51 98,37 100,09 101,93 103,91 106,01 108,15 
Argentina 3,92 4,14 4,55 5,48 8,32 11,11 14,10 17,89 22,97 29,52 
Brazil 1,76 1,67 1,95 2,16 2,36 2,41 2,47 2,53 2,59 2,65 
Cape Verde 83,12 79,23 85,76 83,01 80,54 79,14 78,18 76,98 75,90 75,89 
China 6,77 6,46 6,31 6,20 6,26 6,32 6,38 6,43 6,48 6,67 
Egypt 5,52 5,82 6,01 6,46 6,94 6,94 7,17 7,45 7,70 7,75 
India  45,56 47,92 54,41 60,52 64,10 66,63 69,15 71,16 73,59 75,73 
Morroco 8,42 8,09 8,63 8,41 8,21 8,09 8,01 8,01 8,01 8,01 
Mozambique 32,98 29,07 28,54 30,08 30,41 31,02 31,62 32,29 32,97 33,65 
Paraguay 4591,96 4506,82 4364,29 4436,82 4641,77 4727,74 4780,18 4875,05 5007,84 5131,98 
Portugal 0,75 0,72 0,78 0,75 0,73 0,72 0,71 0,70 0,69 0,68 
South Africa 7,32 7,25 8,21 9,65 10,37 10,66 11,00 11,29 11,61 11,93 
Spain 0,75 0,72 0,78 0,75 0,73 0,72 0,71 0,70 0,69 0,68 
Tunisia 1,43 1,41 1,56 1,62 1,78 1,90 1,99 2,09 2,19 2,29 
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Appendix V: Exchange rates (€)       
Source: 
IMF         
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
Angola 69,26 67,51 74,26 72,66 71,86 71,84 72,26 72,54 72,97 73,43 
Argentina 5,20 5,76 5,85 7,27 11,39 15,48 19,89 25,63 33,38 43,48 
Brazil 2,33 2,33 2,51 2,86 3,23 3,36 3,48 3,62 3,76 3,91 
Cape Verde 110,30 110,24 110,26 110,25 110,25 110,27 110,28 110,27 110,27 111,78 
China 8,98 8,99 8,12 8,23 8,57 8,81 8,99 9,21 9,41 9,83 
Egypt 7,32 8,10 7,72 8,58 9,51 9,67 10,11 10,68 11,19 11,42 
India  60,45 66,68 69,95 80,38 87,75 92,85 97,54 101,93 106,91 111,54 
Morroco 11,17 11,26 11,09 11,17 11,23 11,27 11,30 11,48 11,64 11,80 
Mozambique 43,76 40,44 36,69 39,95 41,62 43,22 44,60 46,26 47,89 49,56 
Paraguay 3460,70 3239,04 3394,82 3340,59 3390,94 3393,00 3388,85 3403,23 3447,10 3484,25 
Portugal                     
South Africa 9,72 10,09 10,55 12,82 14,19 14,86 15,51 16,18 16,86 17,57 
Spain                     
Tunisia 1,90 1,96 2,01 2,16 2,44 2,64 2,81 2,99 3,18 3,37 




Appendix VI: Market Shares Source: Annual Report 
Country 2009 2010 2011 
Brazil 9,1% 8,8% 8,6% 
Cape Verde 72,1% 81,0% 81,5% 
China 0,1% 0,1% 0,1% 
Egypt 8,6% 7,4% 6,4% 
India  0,5% 0,5% 0,5% 
Morroco 8,1% 7,8% 7,5% 
Mozambique 77,0% 81,1% 78,0% 
Portugal 55,8% 55,5% 53,8% 
South Africa 12,6% 10,5% 10,5% 
Spain 10,5% 10,5% 11,4% 
Tunisia 23,4% 23,4% 25,5% 
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Appendix VII: Forecasted Cash Flows                 
Portugal 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 10736 10754 10772 10789 10807 10825 10825 10826 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 543 457 399 359 332 315 316 316 
Exchange Rate € - - - - - - - - 
Price change ex-inflation     1,00% -1,30% -1,00% 0,10% 0,20% 0,00% 
Inflation 1,39% 3,56% 2,78% 0,44% 0,67% 0,24% 0,95% 1,66% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 7157 7034 6474 5914 5353 4793 4233 3673 
Capacity Utilization 65% 54% 51% 51% 52% 55% 62% 72% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 4557 3700 3237 2915 2697 2564 2575 2579 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)                  55 €                    57 €                     59 €                    59 €                     58 €                    59 €                     59 €                    60 €  
Concrete and Agregates 8166 6630 5801 5223 4833 4595 4614 4621 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)                  21 €                    22 €                     23 €                    23 €                     23 €                    23 €                     23 €                    24 €  
Sales Revenues                426 €                 358 €                  325 €                  290 €                  268 €                  255 €                  259 €                  264 €  
Other Revenues                  23 €                    19 €                     17 €                    15 €                     14 €                    14 €                     14 €                    14 €  
Total Revenues (10^6€)                449 €                 377 €                  343 €                  306 €                  282 €                  269 €                  273 €                  278 €  
Cash-costs                311 €                 262 €                  250 €                  221 €                  202 €                  191 €                  192 €                  193 €  
EBITDA                137 €                 116 €                     93 €                    85 €                     80 €                    79 €                     82 €                    85 €  
DA                  55 €                    56 €                     45 €                    48 €                     51 €                    54 €                     57 €                    60 €  
EBIT                  82 €                    59 €                     47 €                    37 €                     29 €                    24 €                     25 €                    25 €  
Taxes                  28 €                    20 €                     16 €                    12 €                     10 €                      8 €                      8 €                      8 €  
WC                  75 €                    68 €                     60 €                    54 €                     50 €                    47 €                     48 €                    49 €  
IWC                   -   €  -                   7 €  -                   8 €  -                   6 €  -                   4 €  -                   2 €                       1 €                      1 €  
CAPEX                  27 €                    17 €                     21 €                    19 €                     18 €                    16 €                     14 €                    12 €  
Appendix VIII: Forecasted Cash Flows         
Spain 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 46506 46834 47162 47490 47818 48146 48520 48894 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 532,1 439,3 385,6 356 337,4 329,9 330,8 323,7 
Exchange Rate € - - - - - - - - 
Price change ex-inflation     1,00% -1,30% -1,00% 0,10% 0,20% 0,00% 
Inflation 2,04% 3,05% 2,44% 1,53% 0,27% 0,24% 0,90% 1,04% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 3132 3211 3011 2811 2612 2412 2212 2012 
Capacity Utilization 72% 59% 55% 55% 57% 60% 66% 72% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 2856 2397 2119 1970 1880 1850 1870 1844 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)                  52 €                    54 €                     55 €                    56 €                    55 €                    55 €                    56 €                    57 €  
Concrete and Agregates 6204 5207 4602 4279 4083 4020 4062 4006 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)                  20 €                    21 €                     22 €                    22 €                    22 €                    22 €                    22 €                    22 €  
Sales Revenues                274 €                  237 €                  217 €                  202 €                  192 €                  189 €                  193 €                  193 €  
Other Revenues                  15 €                    13 €                     12 €                    11 €                    10 €                    10 €                    10 €                    10 €  
Total Revenues (10^6€)                289 €                  250 €                  229 €                  213 €                  202 €                  199 €                  204 €                  203 €  
Cash-costs                236 €                  204 €                  195 €                  180 €                  169 €                  166 €                  168 €                  165 €  
EBITDA                  53 €                    46 €                     34 €                    33 €                    33 €                    34 €                    36 €                    38 €  
DA                  43 €                    53 €                     21 €                    24 €                    26 €                    28 €                    30 €                    32 €  
EBIT                  10 €  -                   6 €                     12 €                       9 €                      7 €                       6 €                       6 €                       5 €  
Taxes                    3 €  -                   2 €                       3 €                       3 €                      2 €                       2 €                       2 €                       1 €  
WC                  57 €                    61 €                     52 €                    48 €                    46 €                    45 €                    46 €                    46 €  
IWC                   -   €                       4 €  -                   9 €  -                   4 €  -                   3 €  -                   1 €                       1 €  -                   0 €  









Appendix X: Forecasted Cash Flows         
Egypt 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 80472 82075 83678 85281 86884 88487 90041,6 91596,2 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 635,3 540,9 514,1 511,9 511,9 511,9 514,4 529,8 
Exchange Rate € 7,32 8,10 7,72 8,58 9,51 9,67 10,11 10,68 
Price change ex-inflation     -1,80% -0,40% -2,30% -0,70% 0,40% 0,00% 
Inflation 11,70% 11,07% 8,65% 6,92% 10,65% 9,83% 8,66% 7,50% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 4005 4013 4088 4163 4238 4313 4388 4463 
Capacity Utilization 86% 75% 72% 71% 71% 71% 72% 74% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 3657 3226 3126 3172 3232 3292 3366 3526 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)          352 EGP             391 EGP             417 EGP             444 EGP             480 EGP             524 EGP             571 EGP             614 EGP  
Concrete and Agregates 96 84 82 83 85 86 88 92 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)          137 EGP             153 EGP             163 EGP             173 EGP             187 EGP             204 EGP             223 EGP             240 EGP  
Sales Revenues       1 300 EGP         1 274 EGP         1 317 EGP         1 424 EGP         1 568 EGP         1 741 EGP         1 943 EGP         2 188 EGP  
Other Revenues            69 EGP               68 EGP               70 EGP               76 EGP               84 EGP               93 EGP             104 EGP             117 EGP  
Total Revenues (10^6€)       1 370 EGP         1 342 EGP         1 388 EGP         1 499 EGP         1 652 EGP         1 834 EGP         2 046 EGP         2 305 EGP  
Cash-costs          806 EGP             789 EGP             943 EGP             992 EGP         1 062 EGP         1 146 EGP         1 241 EGP         1 356 EGP  
EBITDA          564 EGP             553 EGP             444 EGP             508 EGP             589 EGP             688 EGP             805 EGP             949 EGP  
DA            42 EGP               58 EGP             213 EGP             227 EGP             242 EGP             259 EGP             277 EGP             296 EGP  
EBIT          522 EGP             495 EGP             232 EGP             281 EGP             347 EGP             430 EGP             529 EGP             653 EGP  
Taxes          178 EGP             168 EGP               79 EGP               95 EGP             118 EGP             146 EGP             180 EGP             222 EGP  
WC          294 EGP             301 EGP             235 EGP             254 EGP             279 EGP             310 EGP             346 EGP             390 EGP  
IWC                  7 EGP  -           66 EGP               19 EGP               26 EGP               31 EGP               36 EGP               44 EGP  
CAPEX            63 EGP             156 EGP             114 EGP             125 EGP             140 EGP             157 EGP             173 EGP             190 EGP  
Appendix IX: Forecasted Cash Flows         
Brazil 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 201103 203351,6 205600,2 207848,8 210097,4 212346 214398,4 216450,8 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 309,1 327,1 356,9 371,9 398,7 411,3 420,1 432,7 
Exchange Rate € 2,33 2,33 2,51 2,86 3,23 3,36 3,48 3,62 
Price change ex-inflation     0,60% -2,70% 0,70% 0,30% 0,10% 0,00% 
Inflation 5,04% 6,64% 5,40% 6,20% 5,92% 4,18% 4,37% 4,56% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 6511 6630 7296 7962 8628 9294 9960 10626 
Capacity Utilization 67% 71% 73% 73% 76% 76% 76% 74% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 4316 4652 5317 5802 6514 7036 7518 7817 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)           275 BRL            293 BRL             311 BRL             321 BRL             343 BRL             358 BRL             374 BRL             391 BRL  
Concrete and Agregates 1522 1641 1875 2046 2298 2482 2651 2757 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)           107 BRL            114 BRL             121 BRL             125 BRL             134 BRL             140 BRL             146 BRL             153 BRL  
Sales Revenues       1 350 BRL          1 552 BRL         1 881 BRL         2 121 BRL         2 540 BRL         2 867 BRL         3 200 BRL         3 479 BRL  
Other Revenues             72 BRL               83 BRL            100 BRL             113 BRL             136 BRL             153 BRL             171 BRL             186 BRL  
Total Revenues (10^6€)       1 422 BRL          1 635 BRL         1 981 BRL         2 234 BRL         2 676 BRL         3 020 BRL         3 371 BRL         3 665 BRL  
Cash-costs       1 027 BRL          1 180 BRL         1 430 BRL         1 613 BRL         1 932 BRL         2 180 BRL         2 434 BRL         2 646 BRL  
EBITDA           395 BRL            455 BRL             551 BRL             621 BRL             744 BRL             840 BRL             937 BRL          1 019 BRL  
DA             67 BRL               80 BRL            100 BRL             113 BRL             128 BRL             145 BRL             164 BRL             186 BRL  
EBIT           328 BRL            374 BRL             451 BRL             508 BRL             616 BRL             694 BRL             773 BRL             833 BRL  
Taxes           115 BRL            131 BRL             158 BRL             178 BRL             216 BRL             243 BRL             270 BRL             292 BRL  
WC           204 BRL            225 BRL             281 BRL             317 BRL             380 BRL             429 BRL             479 BRL             521 BRL  
IWC                - BRL               21 BRL               57 BRL               36 BRL               63 BRL               49 BRL               50 BRL               42 BRL  
CAPEX           145 BRL            231 BRL             199 BRL             231 BRL             265 BRL             298 BRL             333 BRL             372 BRL  
 




Appendix XI: Forecasted Cash Flows         
Tunísia 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 10525 10627,4 10729,8 10832,2 10934,6 11037 11128,4 11219,8 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 700,9 658,9 632,6 616,6 622,4 628,3 634,2 646,8 
Exchange Rate € 1,90 1,96 2,01 2,16 2,44 2,64 2,81 2,99 
Price change ex-inflation     -1,80% -0,40% -2,30% -0,70% 0,40% 0,00% 
Inflation 4,41% 3,54% 5,56% 6,10% 5,49% 5,01% 4,17% 4,03% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 1668 1751 1829 1906 1984 2061 2139 2216 
Capacity Utilization 95% 90% 84% 79% 78% 76% 75% 74% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 1737 1738 1685 1658 1689 1721 1752 1801 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)             73 TZS                76 TZS                78 TZS                83 TZS                85 TZS                89 TZS                93 TZS                97 TZS  
Concrete and Agregates 820 820 795 782 797 812 827 850 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)             29 TZS                30 TZS                31 TZS                32 TZS                33 TZS                35 TZS                36 TZS                38 TZS  
Sales Revenues           150 TZS              156 TZS              156 TZS              163 TZS              171 TZS              181 TZS             193 TZS              207 TZS  
Other Revenues                8 TZS                  8 TZS                  8 TZS                  9 TZS                  9 TZS                10 TZS                10 TZS                11 TZS  
Total Revenues (10^6€)           158 TZS              164 TZS              165 TZS              171 TZS              180 TZS              191 TZS             203 TZS              218 TZS  
Cash-costs           112 TZS              116 TZS              117 TZS              122 TZS              128 TZS              136 TZS             145 TZS              155 TZS  
EBITDA             46 TZS                47 TZS                48 TZS                50 TZS                52 TZS                55 TZS                59 TZS                63 TZS  
DA             12 TZS                12 TZS                23 TZS                25 TZS                27 TZS                29 TZS                31 TZS                34 TZS  
EBIT             33 TZS                35 TZS                24 TZS                24 TZS                25 TZS                26 TZS                28 TZS                29 TZS  
Taxes                8 TZS                  9 TZS                  6 TZS                  6 TZS                  6 TZS                  7 TZS                  7 TZS                  7 TZS  
WC             25 TZS                21 TZS                28 TZS                29 TZS                30 TZS                32 TZS                34 TZS                36 TZS  
IWC                - TZS  -               4 TZS                  7 TZS                  1 TZS                  1 TZS                  2 TZS                  2 TZS                  2 TZS  
CAPEX             11 TZS                21 TZS                16 TZS                18 TZS                20 TZS                21 TZS                23 TZS                25 TZS  
Appendix XI: Forecasted Cash Flows         
Marroco 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 31627 31966,2 32305,4 32644,6 32983,8 33323 33649,6 33976,2 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 458,6 474,3 478,8 483,4 485,8 488,4 490,9 493,1 
Exchange Rate € 11,17 11,26 11,09 11,17 11,23 11,27 11,30 11,48 
Price change ex-inflation     -1,80% -0,40% -2,30% -0,70% 0,40% 0,00% 
Inflation 0,99% 0,91% 1,29% 1,88% 2,50% 2,50% 2,50% 2,50% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 1327 1290 1373 1457 1540 1623 1707 1790 
Capacity Utilization 85% 93% 89% 86% 82% 79% 77% 74% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 1135 1209 1233 1258 1278 1298 1317 1336 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)        783 MRO          790 MRO           786 MRO           797 MRO           799 MRO           813 MRO           836 MRO           857 MRO  
Concrete and Agregates 336 358 365 372 378 384 390 395 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)        306 MRO          308 MRO           307 MRO           311 MRO           312 MRO           317 MRO           327 MRO           335 MRO  
Sales Revenues        991 MRO      1 066 MRO      1 081 MRO      1 119 MRO      1 138 MRO      1 177 MRO      1 229 MRO      1 278 MRO  
Other Revenues          53 MRO            57 MRO            58 MRO            60 MRO            61 MRO            63 MRO            66 MRO            68 MRO  
Total Revenues (10^6€)     1 044 MRO      1 122 MRO      1 139 MRO      1 179 MRO      1 199 MRO      1 240 MRO      1 295 MRO      1 346 MRO  
Cash-costs        586 MRO          630 MRO           639 MRO           662 MRO           673 MRO           696 MRO           727 MRO           756 MRO  
EBITDA        458 MRO          492 MRO           500 MRO           517 MRO           526 MRO           544 MRO           568 MRO           590 MRO  
DA          64 MRO            84 MRO          108 MRO           119 MRO           127 MRO           136 MRO           145 MRO           155 MRO  
EBIT        395 MRO          408 MRO           392 MRO           398 MRO           399 MRO           408 MRO           423 MRO           435 MRO  
Taxes          79 MRO            82 MRO            78 MRO            80 MRO            80 MRO            82 MRO            85 MRO            87 MRO  
WC        276 MRO          298 MRO           287 MRO           297 MRO           302 MRO           313 MRO           326 MRO           339 MRO  
IWC             - MRO            22 MRO  -         11 MRO             10 MRO              5 MRO            10 MRO            14 MRO            13 MRO  
CAPEX          61 MRO            44 MRO          158 MRO             68 MRO            74 MRO            79 MRO            86 MRO            92 MRO  
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Appendix XIII: Forecasted Cash Flows         
Mozambique 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 22417 22994,2 23571,4 24148,6 24725,8 25303 25963 26623 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 50,4 53,2 57,3 60,7 62,5 64 64,9 66,9 
Exchange Rate € 43,76 40,44 36,69 39,95 41,62 43,22 44,60 46,26 
Price change ex-inflation     -2,00% -3,90% -1,40% -1,50% -0,20% 0,00% 
Inflation 12,70% 10,35% 2,09% 4,21% 5,60% 5,60% 5,60% 5,60% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 732 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 
Capacity Utilization 50% 47% 52% 57% 60% 63% 65% 69% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 884 976 1078 1170 1233 1292 1344 1421 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)    3 865 MZM       4 265 MZM       4 267 MZM       4 273 MZM       4 449 MZM       4 628 MZM       4 878 MZM       5 151 MZM  
Concrete and Agregates 129 143 158 171 180 189 197 208 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)    1 509 MZM       1 665 MZM       1 666 MZM       1 668 MZM       1 737 MZM       1 807 MZM       1 904 MZM       2 011 MZM  
Sales Revenues    3 612 MZM       4 400 MZM       4 861 MZM       5 283 MZM       5 799 MZM       6 321 MZM       6 932 MZM       7 737 MZM  
Other Revenues        193 MZM          235 MZM          259 MZM          282 MZM          310 MZM          337 MZM          370 MZM          413 MZM  
Total Revenues (10^6€)    3 805 MZM       4 635 MZM       5 120 MZM       5 565 MZM       6 109 MZM       6 659 MZM       7 302 MZM       8 150 MZM  
Cash-costs    3 146 MZM       3 833 MZM       4 235 MZM       4 602 MZM       5 052 MZM       5 507 MZM       6 039 MZM       6 740 MZM  
EBITDA        658 MZM          802 MZM          886 MZM          963 MZM       1 057 MZM       1 152 MZM       1 263 MZM       1 410 MZM  
DA        360 MZM          292 MZM          290 MZM          319 MZM          350 MZM          383 MZM          419 MZM          457 MZM  
EBIT        298 MZM          510 MZM          596 MZM          644 MZM          707 MZM          769 MZM          844 MZM          953 MZM  
Taxes          83 MZM          143 MZM          167 MZM          180 MZM          198 MZM          215 MZM          236 MZM          267 MZM  
WC        341 MZM          659 MZM          497 MZM          540 MZM          593 MZM          647 MZM          709 MZM          792 MZM  
IWC             - MZM          318 MZM  -       162 MZM             43 MZM             53 MZM             53 MZM             62 MZM             82 MZM  
CAPEX        683 MZM       1 416 MZM          381 MZM          397 MZM          419 MZM          442 MZM          467 MZM          493 MZM  
 
 
Appendix XII: Forecasted Cash Flows         
Turkey 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 77804 78747,8 79691,6 80635,4 81579,2 82523 83369,8 84216,6 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 735,2 828,7 843,9 859,4 871 882,7 894,6 916,9 
Exchange Rate € 1,99 2,33 2,31 2,53 3,10 3,23 3,39 3,54 
Price change ex-inflation     -1,80% -0,40% -2,30% -0,70% 0,40% 0,00% 
Inflation 8,57% 6,47% 8,89% 7,49% 7,77% 8,23% 7,40% 6,58% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 3027 3005 3232 3460 3687 3915 4142 4370 
Capacity Utilization 86% 91% 87% 84% 81% 78% 75% 74% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 2884 3034 3127 3222 3304 3387 3468 3590 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)             75 TRY               79 TRY               85 TRY               91 TRY               96 TRY            103 TRY             111 TRY             118 TRY  
Concrete and Agregates 3089 3249 3349 3450 3538 3627 3714 3845 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)             29 TRY               31 TRY               33 TRY               35 TRY               37 TRY               40 TRY               43 TRY               46 TRY  
Sales Revenues           305 TRY            341 TRY             376 TRY             415 TRY             448 TRY             494 TRY             545 TRY             601 TRY  
Other Revenues             16 TRY               18 TRY               20 TRY               22 TRY               24 TRY               26 TRY               29 TRY               32 TRY  
Total Revenues (10^6€)           321 TRY            360 TRY             396 TRY             437 TRY             472 TRY             520 TRY             574 TRY             633 TRY  
Cash-costs           260 TRY            292 TRY             318 TRY             348 TRY             372 TRY             405 TRY             443 TRY             484 TRY  
EBITDA             61 TRY               68 TRY               78 TRY               89 TRY            100 TRY             115 TRY             131 TRY             150 TRY  
DA             45 TRY               39 TRY               45 TRY               47 TRY               50 TRY               54 TRY               57 TRY               61 TRY  
EBIT             16 TRY               29 TRY               33 TRY               42 TRY               50 TRY               61 TRY               74 TRY               88 TRY  
Taxes               5 TRY                  9 TRY               11 TRY               13 TRY               16 TRY               19 TRY               24 TRY               28 TRY  
WC             51 TRY               47 TRY               74 TRY               81 TRY               88 TRY               96 TRY            106 TRY             118 TRY  
IWC                - TRY  -              5 TRY                27 TRY                 8 TRY                 6 TRY                 9 TRY               10 TRY               11 TRY  
CAPEX             12 TRY               25 TRY               20 TRY               23 TRY               26 TRY               30 TRY               34 TRY               38 TRY  
 




Appendix XV: Forecasted Cash Flows         
India 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 1173108 1188825,6 1204543,2 1220260,8 1235978,4 1251696 1266575,4 1281454,8 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 210,3 213,7 219,3 225,1 231,1 236,1 241,1 248,3 
Exchange Rate € 60,45 66,68 69,95 80,38 87,75 92,85 97,54 101,93 
Price change ex-inflation     1,70% -11,10% 0,10% 2,00% 2,40% 0,00% 
Inflation 10,53% 9,55% 10,21% 9,48% 8,41% 7,53% 7,62% 7,72% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 1149 1167 1237 1307 1376 1446 1516 1586 
Capacity Utilization 83% 80% 79% 78% 77% 75% 74% 74% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 949 927 964 1002 1042 1078 1114 1161 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)  ₹           3 165   ₹             3 467  ₹             3 886  ₹             3 782  ₹             4 105  ₹             4 502  ₹             4 961  ₹             5 344  
Concrete and Agregates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)  ₹                    -  ₹             1 354  ₹             1 517  ₹             1 477  ₹             1 603  ₹             1 758  ₹             1 937  ₹             2 087  
Sales Revenues  ₹           3 004   ₹             3 214  ₹             3 746  ₹             3 791  ₹             4 278  ₹             4 855  ₹             5 528  ₹             6 205  
Other Revenues  ₹              160   ₹                172  ₹                200  ₹                202   ₹                228   ₹                259  ₹                295  ₹                331  
Total Revenues (10^6€)  ₹           3 164   ₹             3 386  ₹             3 946  ₹             3 993  ₹             4 506  ₹             5 114  ₹             5 823  ₹             6 536  
Cash-costs  ₹           2 814   ₹             3 012  ₹             3 602  ₹             3 565  ₹             3 932  ₹             4 359  ₹             4 846  ₹             5 307  
EBITDA  ₹              350   ₹                374  ₹                344  ₹                429   ₹                575   ₹                755  ₹                977  ₹             1 229  
DA  ₹              384   ₹                434  ₹                478  ₹                510   ₹                545   ₹                584  ₹                626  ₹                672  
EBIT  ₹               -35   ₹                 -60  ₹              -134   ₹                 -81  ₹                  30   ₹                172  ₹                352  ₹                557  
Taxes  ₹               -10   ₹                 -17  ₹                 -38  ₹                 -23  ₹                     9  ₹                  49   ₹                101  ₹                160  
WC  ₹              719   ₹                353  ₹                587  ₹                594   ₹                670   ₹                760  ₹                866  ₹                972  
IWC  ₹                    -  ₹              -366   ₹                233  ₹                     7  ₹                  76   ₹                  90   ₹                105  ₹                106  
CAPEX  ₹              166   ₹                597  ₹                261  ₹                302   ₹                345   ₹                390  ₹                440  ₹                496  
 
Appendix XIV: Forecasted Cash Flows         
South Africa 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 49109 48944,4 48779,8 48615,2 48450,6 48286 48334,8 48383,6 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 219,4 238,5 243,9 247 250,2 252,2 254,1 259,2 
Exchange Rate € 9,72 10,09 10,55 12,82 14,19 14,86 15,51 16,18 
Price change ex-inflation     -2,00% -3,90% -1,40% -1,50% -0,20% 0,00% 
Inflation 4,27% 5,00% 5,65% 5,75% 5,98% 5,95% 5,60% 5,25% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 1465 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 
Capacity Utilization 58% 58% 59% 59% 60% 60% 61% 62% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 1152 1230 1254 1265 1277 1283 1294 1321 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)  R              896   R                941   R                974   R                990   R             1 034   R             1 080   R             1 138   R             1 197  
Concrete and Agregates 683 729 743 750 757 760 767 783 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)  R              350   R                367   R                380   R                387   R                404   R                421   R                444   R                468  
Sales Revenues  R           1 271   R             1 425   R             1 504   R             1 542   R             1 627   R             1 706   R             1 813   R             1 949  
Other Revenues  R                 68   R                  76   R                  80   R                  82   R                  87   R                  91   R                  97   R                104  
Total Revenues (10^6€)  R           1 339   R             1 501   R             1 584   R             1 625   R             1 714   R             1 797   R             1 910   R             2 053  
Cash-costs  R              821   R                920   R                971   R                996   R             1 051   R             1 102   R             1 171   R             1 259  
EBITDA  R              518   R                581   R                613   R                628   R                663   R                695   R                739   R                794  
DA  R              131   R                134   R                  96   R                104   R                112   R                121   R                132   R                143  
EBIT  R              387   R                447   R                516   R                525   R                551   R                574   R                607   R                651  
Taxes  R              116   R                134   R                155   R                157   R                165   R                172   R                182   R                195  
WC  R              143   R                161   R                169   R                174   R                183   R                192   R                204   R                220  
IWC  R                    -   R                  17   R                     9   R                     4   R                  10   R                     9   R                  12   R                  15  
CAPEX  R                 52   R                  64   R                  70   R                  90   R                106   R                112   R                129   R                142  
 





Appendix XVII: Forecasted Cash Flows         
Cape Verde 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 509 516,4 523,8 531,2 538,6 546 553,4 560,8 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 632,2 617,4 615,3 616,4 619,4 626,8 636,3 655,4 
Exchange Rate € 110,30 110,24 110,26 110,25 110,25 110,27 110,28 110,27 
Price change ex-inflation     -2,00% -3,90% -1,40% -1,50% -0,20% 0,00% 
Inflation 2,08% 4,47% 2,54% 1,51% 1,75% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne)                 
Capacity Utilization                 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 234 227 229 233 238 244 251 262 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)  ¥         10 270  ¥           10 729   ¥           10 782  ¥           10 518  ¥           10 552  ¥           10 602   ¥           10 792  ¥           11 008  
Concrete and Agregates 227 221 223 227 231 237 244 254 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)  ¥           4 010  ¥             4 189  ¥             4 210  ¥             4 107  ¥             4 120  ¥             4 139  ¥             4 214  ¥             4 298  
Sales Revenues  ¥           3 315  ¥             3 360  ¥             3 413  ¥             3 383  ¥             3 457  ¥             3 564  ¥             3 732  ¥             3 974  
Other Revenues  ¥               177   ¥                179  ¥                182  ¥                181  ¥                185  ¥                190  ¥                199  ¥                212  
Total Revenues (10^6€)  ¥           3 492  ¥             3 539  ¥             3 595  ¥             3 563  ¥             3 642  ¥             3 754  ¥             3 932  ¥             4 186  
Cash-costs  ¥           3 099  ¥             3 141  ¥             3 190  ¥             3 162  ¥             3 232  ¥             3 331  ¥             3 489  ¥             3 715  
EBITDA  ¥               393   ¥                399  ¥                405  ¥                401  ¥                410  ¥                423  ¥                443  ¥                471  
DA  ¥                 97  ¥                   98   ¥                100  ¥                   99   ¥                101  ¥                104  ¥                109  ¥                116  
EBIT  ¥               296   ¥                300  ¥                305  ¥                302  ¥                309  ¥                318  ¥                333  ¥                355  
Taxes  ¥                 89  ¥                   90   ¥                   91   ¥                   91   ¥                   93   ¥                   95   ¥                100  ¥                106  
WC  ¥               276   ¥                   33   ¥                222  ¥                220  ¥                225  ¥                232  ¥                243  ¥                259  
IWC  ¥                    -  ¥               -243  ¥                189  ¥                   -2   ¥                     5  ¥                     7   ¥                   11   ¥                   16  
CAPEX         
Appendix XVI: Forecasted Cash Flows   8,80% 9,40% 7,90% 7,90% 7,90% 7,90% 
China 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 1330141 1336415,4 1342689,8 1348964,2 1355238,6 1361513 1366119,4 1370725,8 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 1394,9 1517 1569,8 1601,1 1625 1641,1 1649,3 1665,8 
Exchange Rate € 8,98 8,99 8,12 8,23 8,57 8,81 8,99 9,21 
Price change ex-inflation     -18,50% -3,10% 1,20% 0,50% -0,50% -0,50% 
Inflation 3,33% 5,42% 2,65% 2,63% 3,00% 2,00% 2,00% 2,00% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 5270 5962 6013 6064 6114 6165 6216 6267 
Capacity Utilization 71% 59% 71% 77% 83% 88% 95% 91% 
Sales                 
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 4105 3893 4236 4634 5000 5395 5821 6281 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)  ¥               265   ¥                279   ¥                234   ¥                232   ¥                242   ¥                248   ¥                252   ¥                256  
Concrete and Agregates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)  ¥                    -   ¥                      -   ¥                      -   ¥                      -   ¥                      -   ¥                      -   ¥                      -   ¥                      -  
Sales Revenues  ¥           1 088   ¥             1 088   ¥                990   ¥             1 077   ¥             1 211   ¥             1 340   ¥             1 467   ¥             1 607  
Other Revenues  ¥                 58   ¥                   58   ¥                   53   ¥                   57   ¥                   65   ¥                   72   ¥                   78   ¥                   86  
Total Revenues (10^6€)  ¥           1 146   ¥             1 146   ¥             1 043   ¥             1 134   ¥             1 276   ¥             1 411   ¥             1 546   ¥             1 692  
Cash-costs  ¥               985   ¥                985   ¥                880   ¥                939   ¥             1 036   ¥             1 123   ¥             1 205   ¥             1 293  
EBITDA  ¥               160   ¥                160   ¥                163   ¥                195   ¥                240   ¥                288   ¥                340   ¥                400  
DA  ¥                 75   ¥                   83   ¥                106   ¥                109   ¥                111   ¥                114   ¥                117   ¥                120  
EBIT  ¥                 85   ¥                   77   ¥                   57   ¥                   87   ¥                129   ¥                174   ¥                223   ¥                279  
Taxes  ¥                 30   ¥                   27   ¥                   20   ¥                   30   ¥                   45   ¥                   61   ¥                   78   ¥                   98  
WC  ¥               252   ¥                381   ¥                325   ¥                354   ¥                398   ¥                440   ¥                482   ¥                528  
IWC  ¥                    -   ¥                130   ¥                 -56   ¥                   29   ¥                   44   ¥                   42   ¥                   42   ¥                   46  
CAPEX  ¥                 54   ¥                127   ¥                   99   ¥                103   ¥                107   ¥                110   ¥                113   ¥                116  
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Appendix XVIII: Tax Rates and Growth Rates 
source Damodaran GDP (PPP) in current US$ billions - source: 'PwC forecasts of GDP (PPP), January, 2011  
Country 
Marginal Tax 





Angola 35% 154 521 213 085 1 064 100 4,38% 4,10% 4,24% 
Argentina 35% 844 267 1 055 782 3 805 449 3,40% 3,26% 3,33% 
Brazil 34% 2 656 858 3 385 432 12 054 725 3,42% 3,23% 3,32% 
Cape Verde 29% 2 518 3 368 12 732 3,67% 3,38% 3,52% 
China 25% 15 923 626 22 847 135 114 320 131 4,48% 4,11% 4,29% 
Egypt 25% 611 713 799 891 3 285 580 3,81% 3,60% 3,70% 
India 34% 5 750 467 8 270 673 53 414 318 5,08% 4,77% 4,93% 
Marroco 29% 203 372 274 559 1 046 852 3,71% 3,40% 3,56% 
Mozambique 32% 32 367 51 216 309 818 5,15% 4,60% 4,88% 
Portugal 25% 258 106 305 033 619 931 1,97% 1,79% 1,88% 
South Africa 28% 656 709 832 703 2 603 792 3,11% 2,89% 3,00% 
Spain 30% 1 449 619 1 694 101 4 541 856 2,57% 2,50% 2,53% 
Tunisia 30% 122 408 161 365 606 291 3,62% 3,36% 3,49% 
Turkey 20% 1 307 034 1 734 609 7 675 898 4,01% 3,79% 3,90% 
 
 
Appendix XIX: Ratings and Spreads 
> ≤ to Rating is Spread is 
8.50 100000 Aaa/AAA 0.40% 
6.5 8.499999 Aa2/AA 0.70% 
5.5 6.499999 A1/A+ 0.85% 
4.25 5.499999 A2/A 1.00% 
3 4.249999 A3/A- 1.30% 
2.5 2.999999 Baa2/BBB 2.00% 
2.25 2.49999 Ba1/BB+ 3.00% 
2 2.2499999 Ba2/BB 4.00% 
1.75 1.999999 B1/B+ 5.50% 
1.5 1.749999 B2/B 6.50% 
1.25 1.499999 B3/B- 7.25% 
0.8 1.249999 Caa/CCC 8.75% 
0.65 0.799999 Ca2/CC 9.50% 
0.2 0.649999 C2/C 10.50% 








debt MV Debt Mcap 
Intercement BB 4% 1,89% 5,89% 768 € 968 € 
Cimpor BBB 2% 1,89% 3,89% 1 623 € 3 377 € 
NewCo   2,21% 1,89% 4,10% 2 391 € 4 345 € 
 
D/V V E/V D/E EV DCF 
44% 1 736 € 0,56 0,79 647 € 
32% 5 000 € 0,68 0,48 5 496 € 
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Appendix XX: WACC (2)       





Risk-free rate 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 
Equity Risk Premium 5% 5% 5,00% 5% 5% 5% 
Country Risk Premium 4,88% 9,00% 2,63% 2,63% 3,72% 1,05% 
Unlevered Beta 0,75 0,75 75,00% 0,75 0,75 0,75 
Tax Rate 35% 35% 34,00% 34% 28,75% 25% 
D/E 48% 79% 79% 48% 48% 48% 
Levered Beta 0,98 1,14 1,14 0,99 1,01 1,02 
Cost of Equity 12% 18% 11% 9% 11% 8% 
E/V 68% 56% 55,77% 68% 68% 68% 
Cost of Debt 3,89% 5,89% 5,89% 3,89% 3,89% 3,89% 
D/V 32% 44% 44% 32% 32% 32% 
WACC 9,10% 12,53% 8,52% 7,63% 8,47% 6,71% 
 
Egypt India Morroco Mozambique Portugal 
South 
Africa Spain Tunisia Turkey 
1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
7,50% 3,00% 3,60% 3,72% 4,88% 1,73% 3,00% 3,00% 3,60% 
0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 
25% 33,99% 28,75% 32,00% 25% 28% 30% 30% 20% 
48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 48% 
1,02 0,99 1,01 1,00 1,02 1,01 1,00 1,00 1,04 
15% 10% 11% 11% 12% 9% 10% 10% 11% 
68% 68% 68% 68% 68% 68% 68% 68% 68% 
3,89% 3,89% 3,89% 3,89% 3,89% 3,89% 3,89% 3,89% 3,89% 
32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 







Appendix XXI: NewCo 
WACC       





Risk-free rate 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 
Equity Risk Premium 5% 5% 5,00% 5% 5% 5% 
Country Risk Premium 4,88% 9,00% 2,63% 2,63% 3,72% 1,05% 
Unlevered Beta 0,75 0,75 75,00% 0,75 0,75 0,75 
Tax Rate 35% 35% 34,00% 34% 28,75% 25% 
D/E 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
Levered Beta 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,00 1,02 1,04 
Cost of Equity 12% 16% 10% 10% 11% 8% 
E/V 66% 66% 66,30% 66% 66% 66% 
Cost of Debt 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 
D/V 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 
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Egypt India Morroco Mozambique Portugal 
South 
Africa Spain Tunisia Turkey 
1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 1,89% 
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
7,50% 3,00% 3,60% 3,72% 4,88% 1,73% 3,00% 3,00% 3,60% 
0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,75 
25% 33,99% 28,75% 32,00% 25% 28% 30% 30% 20% 
51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 51% 
1,04 1,00 1,02 1,01 1,04 1,03 1,02 1,02 1,06 
15% 10% 11% 11% 12% 9% 10% 10% 11% 
66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 66% 
4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 4,10% 
34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 34% 
11,24% 7,96% 8,48% 8,48% 9,44% 7,22% 8,04% 8,04% 8,67% 
 
 
Appendix XXII: Depreciations and CAPEX 
Portugal 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 6970 7157 7034 6474 5914 5353 4793 4233 3673 
Inflation     3,6% 2,8% 0,4% 0,7% 0,2% 0,9% 1,7% 
gross PPP 1 013 642 1 084 766 1 045 439 1 111 983 1 179 666 1 248 564 1 318 636 1 390 024 1 462 838 
Acumulated Dep 588 088 647 100 624 749 670 113 718 365 769 553 823 731 880 950 941 267 
Net assets 425 555 437 666 420 691 441 870 461 302 479 010 494 904 509 073 521 571 
D&A   55 186 56 163 45 364 48 252 51 189 54 178 57 219 60 317 
CAPEX 23 026 27 305 16 990 21 179 19 432 17 709 15 894 14 169 12 498 
 
Appendix XXIII: Depreciations and CAPEX 
Spain 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 3220 3132 3211 3011 2811 2612 2412 2212 2012 
Inflation 0,02043 2,0% 3,1% 2,4% 1,5% 0,3% 0,2% 0,9% 1,0% 
Activo Bruto 486 548 488 145 495 208 544 644 594 769 645 253 696 095 747 440 799 304 
Acumulated Dep 282 282 291 195 295 934 317 422 341 055 366 864 394 863 425 068 457 501 
Activo Líquido 204 266 196 950 199 275 227 222 253 713 278 389 301 232 322 371 341 802 
D&A   43 003 52 548 21 488 23 633 25 808 27 999 30 205 32 433 
CAPEX 18 800 26 719 39 335 27 947 26 491 24 676 22 843 21 139 19 431 
 
Appendix XXIV: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
Brazil 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 6280 6511 6630 7296 7962 8628 9294 9960 10626 
Exchange rate 2,33 2,33 2,33 2,51 2,86 3,23 3,36 3,48 3,62 
Inflation 5,0% 5,0% 6,6% 5,4% 6,2% 5,9% 4,2% 4,4% 4,6% 
Activo Bruto 2 247 973 2 279 088 2 307 158 2 606 740 2 951 035 3 344 444 3 787 357 4 284 776 4 842 255 
Acumulated Dep 1 304 213 1 359 555 1 378 744 1 478 858 1 591 971 1 720 023 1 865 147 2 029 490 2 215 417 
Activo Líquido 943 760 919 534 928 413 1 127 882 1 359 064 1 624 421 1 922 210 2 255 286 2 626 838 
D&A   67 251 80 244 100 113 113 113 128 053 145 124 164 343 185 927 














Appendix XXV: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
Egypt 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 3900 4005 4013 4088 4163 4238 4313 4388 4463 
Exchange rate 7,32 7,32 8,10 7,72 8,58 9,51 9,67 10,11 10,68 
Inflation 11,7% 11,7% 11,1% 8,7% 6,9% 10,7% 9,8% 8,7% 7,5% 
Activo Bruto 4 302 656 4 366 391 4 901 054 5 228 165 5 579 627 5 962 092 6 377 674 6 827 844 7 313 734 
Acumulated Dep 2 496 284 2 604 702 2 928 842 3 141 511 3 368 374 3 610 488 3 869 198 4 145 941 4 442 218 
Activo Líquido 1 806 372 1 761 688 1 972 212 2 086 654 2 211 253 2 351 604 2 508 477 2 681 903 2 871 516 
D&A   41 620 57 743 212 669 226 863 242 114 258 710 276 743 296 277 




Appendix XXVI: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
Marroco 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 1280 1327 1290 1373 1457 1540 1623 1707 1790 
Exchange rate 11,17 11,17 11,26 11,09 11,17 11,23 11,27 11,30 11,48 
Inflation 1,0% 1,0% 0,9% 1,3% 1,9% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 2,5% 
Activo Bruto 2 150 982 2 423 061 2 477 438 2 743 065 2 929 922 3 130 559 3 345 816 3 576 575 3 823 770 
Acumulated Dep 1 247 941 1 445 439 1 480 503 1 588 005 1 707 033 1 834 170 1 970 012 2 115 196 2 270 392 
Activo Líquido 903 041 977 622 996 935 1 155 060 1 222 889 1 296 390 1 375 803 1 461 380 1 553 378 
D&A   63 516 83 871 107 502 119 028 127 137 135 843 145 183 155 196 




Appendix XXVII: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
Tunísia 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 1640 1668 1751 1829 1906 1984 2061 2139 2216 
Exchange rate 1,90 1,90 1,96 2,01 2,16 2,44 2,64 2,81 2,99 
Inflation   4,4% 3,5% 5,6% 6,1% 5,5% 5,0% 4,2% 4,0% 
Activo Bruto 471 676 515 073 538 892 578 341 621 204 667 665 717 921 772 079 830 384 
Acumulated Dep 273 654 307 259 322 039 345 423 370 518 397 474 426 446 457 598 491 100 
Activo Líquido 198 022 207 814 216 853 232 919 250 686 270 192 291 475 314 482 339 284 
D&A   12 391 12 127 23 384 25 096 26 956 28 972 31 152 33 502 




Appendix XXVIII: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
Turkey 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 2430 3027 3005 3232 3460 3687 3915 4142 4370 
Exchange rate 1,99 1,99 2,33 2,31 2,53 3,10 3,23 3,39 3,54 
Inflation   8,6% 6,5% 8,9% 7,5% 7,8% 8,2% 7,4% 6,6% 
Activo Bruto 909 102 972 890 1 025 932 1 090 201 1 160 232 1 236 679 1 320 334 1 411 712 1 511 292 
Acumulated Dep 527 436 580 362 613 091 657 609 704 915 755 261 808 923 866 216 927 473 
Activo Líquido 381 666 392 528 412 841 432 592 455 317 481 419 511 411 545 497 583 819 
D&A   44 616 38 689 44 518 47 306 50 345 53 663 57 293 61 258 
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Appendix XXIX: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
Mozambique 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 685 732 858 858 858 858 858 858 858 
Exchange rate 43,76 43,76 40,44 36,69 39,95 41,62 43,22 44,60 46,26 
Inflation   12,7% 10,4% 2,1% 4,2% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 5,6% 
Activo Bruto 4 435 342 4 746 553 6 676 152 7 346 448 8 061 845 8 830 496 9 655 955 10 542 000 11 492 648 
Acumulated Dep 2 573 265 2 831 482 3 989 630 4 279 325 4 598 105 4 947 929 5 331 106 5 750 101 6 207 545 
Activo Líquido 1 862 078 1 915 071 2 686 521 3 067 123 3 463 740 3 882 567 4 324 849 4 791 899 5 285 103 
D&A   360 072 292 414 289 695 318 780 349 823 383 177 418 996 457 443 





Appendix XXX: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
South Africa 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 1640 1465 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 1582 
Exchange rate 9,72 9,72 10,09 10,55 12,82 14,19 14,86 15,51 16,18 
Inflation   4,3% 5,0% 5,7% 5,8% 6,0% 6,0% 5,6% 5,3% 
Activo Bruto 2 215 833 2 107 830 2 221 170 2 387 814 2 581 667 2 799 580 3 032 932 3 294 036 3 579 124 
Acumulated Dep 1 285 566 1 257 393 1 327 359 1 423 741 1 527 354 1 639 379 1 760 859 1 892 466 2 035 402 
Activo Líquido 930 267 850 437 893 811 964 074 1 054 313 1 160 202 1 272 073 1 401 571 1 543 722 
D&A   131 345 133 628 96 382 103 613 112 025 121 481 131 606 142 936 





Appendix XXXI: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
India 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 1180 1149 1167 1237 1307 1376 1446 1516 1586 
Exchange rate 60,45 60,45 66,68 69,95 80,38 87,75 92,85 97,54 101,93 
Inflation 10,5% 10,5% 9,6% 10,2% 9,5% 8,4% 7,5% 7,6% 7,7% 
Activo Bruto 10 723 619 9 836 618 11 006 539 11 745 531 12 557 517 13 447 674 14 421 281 15 487 137 16 655 035 
Acumulated Dep 6 221 552 5 867 881 6 577 445 7 055 046 7 564 713 8 109 615 8 693 143 9 318 918 9 990 943 
Activo Líquido 4 502 067 3 968 737 4 429 094 4 690 485 4 992 803 5 338 059 5 728 138 6 168 219 6 664 093 
D&A   384 240 434 009 477 601 509 668 544 902 583 528 625 775 672 025 





Appendix XXXII: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
China 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 2725 5270 5962 6013 6064 6114 6165 6216 6267 
Exchange rate 8,98 8,98 8,99 8,12 8,23 8,57 8,81 8,99 9,21 
Inflation 3,3% 3,3% 5,4% 2,7% 2,6% 3,0% 2,0% 2,0% 2,0% 
Activo Bruto 4 917 325 7 308 826 7 914 936 8 119 840 8 330 953 8 548 851 8 772 695 9 002 645 9 238 861 
Acumulated Dep 2 852 898 4 359 966 4 729 921 4 835 697 4 944 212 5 055 548 5 169 796 5 287 036 5 407 348 
Activo Líquido 2 064 427 2 948 860 3 185 015 3 284 143 3 386 741 3 493 303 3 602 899 3 715 609 3 831 513 
D&A   75 390 83 297 105 776 108 515 111 336 114 248 117 240 120 313 
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Appendix XXXIII: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Portugal 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
EBITDA 93 € 85 € 80 € 79 € 82 € 85 €   
Taxes 16 € 12 € 10 € 8 € 8 € 8 €   
IWC -8 € -6 € -4 € -2 € 1 € 1 €   
CAPEX 21 € 19 € 18 € 16 € 14 € 12 €   
FCFF 63 € 59 € 57 € 57 € 59 € 63 € 865 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9145 0,8364 0,7649 0,6995 0,6398 0,5851 0,5351 
PV 58 € 50 € 44 € 40 € 37 € 37 € 463 € 
EV 728 €             
 
 
Appendix XXXIV: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Spain 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
EBITDA 34 € 33 € 33 € 34 € 36 € 38 €   
Taxes 3 € 3 € 2 € 2 € 2 € 1 €   
IWC -9 € -4 € -3 € -1 € 1 € 0 €   
CAPEX 28 € 26 € 25 € 23 € 21 € 19 €   
FCFF 11 € 7 € 9 € 10 € 12 € 17 € 317 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9263 0,8581 0,7948 0,7363 0,6820 0,6318 0,5852 
PV 11 € 6 € 7 € 7 € 8 € 11 € 186 € 
EV 236 €             
 
 
Appendix XXXV: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Brazil 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 2,51 2,86 3,23 3,36 3,48 3,62  
EBITDA 219 € 217 € 230 € 250 € 269 € 281 €   
Taxes 63 € 62 € 67 € 72 € 78 € 80 €   
IWC 23 € 13 € 19 € 15 € 14 € 12 €   
CAPEX 79 € 81 € 82 € 89 € 96 € 103 €   
FCFF 54 € 62 € 62 € 74 € 81 € 87 € 2 081 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9291 0,8633 0,8021 0,7453 0,6925 0,6434 0,5978 
PV 51 € 53 € 50 € 55 € 56 € 56 € 1 244 € 
EV 1 565 €             
 
 
Appendix XXXVI: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Egypt 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 7,72 8,58 9,51 9,67 10,11 10,68  
EBITDA 58 € 59 € 62 € 71 € 80 € 89 €   
Taxes 10 € 11 € 12 € 15 € 18 € 21 €   
IWC -9 € 2 € 3 € 3 € 4 € 4 €   
CAPEX 15 € 15 € 15 € 16 € 17 € 18 €   
FCFF 41 € 31 € 32 € 37 € 41 € 46 € 644 € 
Discounting Factor 0,8997 0,8094 0,7282 0,6551 0,5894 0,5302 0,4770 
PV 37 € 25 € 23 € 24 € 24 € 25 € 307 € 
EV 466 €             
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Appendix XXXVII: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Marroco 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 11,09 11,17 11,23 11,27 11,30 11,48  
EBITDA 45 € 46 € 47 € 48 € 50 € 51 €   
Taxes 7 € 7 € 7 € 7 € 7 € 8 €   
IWC -1 € 1 € 0 € 1 € 1 € 1 €   
CAPEX 14 € 6 € 7 € 7 € 8 € 8 €   
FCFF 25 € 32 € 33 € 33 € 34 € 35 € 744 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9226 0,8512 0,7854 0,7246 0,6685 0,6168 0,5691 
PV 23 € 27 € 26 € 24 € 23 € 21 € 423 € 
EV 567 €             
 
Appendix XXXVIII: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Tunisia 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 2,01 2,16 2,44 2,64 2,81 2,99  
EBITDA 24 € 23 € 21 € 21 € 21 € 21 €   
Taxes 3 € 3 € 3 € 2 € 2 € 2 €   
IWC 3 € 1 € 1 € 1 € 1 € 1 €   
CAPEX 8 € 8 € 8 € 8 € 8 € 8 €   
FCFF 9 € 11 € 10 € 10 € 10 € 9 € 220 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9263 0,8581 0,7948 0,7363 0,6820 0,6318 0,5852 
PV 9 € 10 € 8 € 7 € 7 € 6 € 129 € 
EV 175 €             
 
Appendix XXXIX: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Turkey 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 2,31 2,53 3,10 3,23 3,39 3,54  
EBITDA 34 € 35 € 32 € 35 € 39 € 42 €   
Taxes 5 € 5 € 5 € 6 € 7 € 8 €   
IWC 12 € 3 € 2 € 3 € 3 € 3 €   
CAPEX 9 € 9 € 8 € 9 € 10 € 11 €   
FCFF 9 € 18 € 17 € 17 € 19 € 20 € 452 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9211 0,8484 0,7814 0,7197 0,6629 0,6106 0,5624 
PV 8 € 15 € 13 € 12 € 12 € 12 € 254 € 
EV 328 €             
 
Appendix XL: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Mozambique 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 36,69 39,95 41,62 43,22 44,60 46,26  
EBITDA 24 € 24 € 25 € 27 € 28 € 30 €   
Taxes 5 € 5 € 5 € 5 € 5 € 6 €   
IWC -4 € 1 € 1 € 1 € 1 € 2 €   
CAPEX 10 € 10 € 10 € 10 € 10 € 11 €   
FCFF 14 € 9 € 9 € 10 € 11 € 12 € 365 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9225 0,8511 0,7851 0,7243 0,6682 0,6164 0,5687 
PV 13 € 7 € 7 € 7 € 7 € 8 € 208 € 
EV 257 €             
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Appendix XLI: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
South Africa 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 10,55 12,82 14,19 14,86 15,51 16,18  
EBITDA 58 € 49 € 47 € 47 € 48 € 49 €   
Taxes 15 € 12 € 12 € 12 € 12 € 12 €   
IWC 1 € 0 € 1 € 1 € 1 € 1 €   
CAPEX 7 € 7 € 7 € 8 € 8 € 9 €   
FCFF 36 € 29 € 27 € 27 € 27 € 27 € 681 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9335 0,8714 0,8135 0,7594 0,7089 0,6617 0,6177 
PV 33 € 26 € 22 € 21 € 19 € 18 € 421 € 
EV 559 €             
 
Appendix XLII: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
India 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 69,95 80,38 87,75 92,85 97,54 101,93  
EBITDA 5 € 5 € 7 € 8 € 10 € 12 €   
Taxes -1 € 0 € 0 € 1 € 1 € 2 €   
IWC 3 € 0 € 1 € 1 € 1 € 1 €   
CAPEX 4 € 4 € 4 € 4 € 5 € 5 €   
FCFF -2 € 2 € 2 € 2 € 3 € 5 € 163 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9270 0,8593 0,7965 0,7384 0,6845 0,6345 0,5882 
PV -1 € 2 € 1 € 2 € 2 € 3 € 96 € 
EV 104 €             
 
Appendix XLIII: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
China 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 8,12 8,23 8,57 8,81 8,99 9,21  
EBITDA 20 € 24 € 28 € 33 € 38 € 43 €   
Taxes 2 € 4 € 5 € 7 € 9 € 11 €   
IWC -7 € 3 € 5 € 5 € 5 € 5 €   
CAPEX 12 € 12 € 12 € 12 € 13 € 13 €   
FCFF 12 € 4 € 5 € 9 € 12 € 15 € 657 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9371 0,8782 0,8230 0,7713 0,7228 0,6773 0,6348 
PV 12 € 4 € 4 € 7 € 9 € 10 € 417 € 
EV 462 €             
 
 
Appendix XLIV: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Cape Verde 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 110,26 110,25 110,25 110,27 110,28 110,27  
EBITDA 4 € 4 € 4 € 4 € 4 € 4 €   
Taxes 1 € 1 € 1 € 1 € 1 € 1 €   
IWC 2 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 0 €   
CAPEX 0 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 0 € 0 €   
FCFF 1 € 3 € 3 € 3 € 3 € 3 € 66 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9219 0,8500 0,7836 0,7225 0,6661 0,6141 0,5661 
PV 1 € 2 € 2 € 2 € 2 € 2 € 38 € 
EV 49 €             
 
 





Appendix XLVI: Forecasted Cash Flows (InterCement) 
Brazil 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 201103 203351,6 205600,2 207848,8 210097,4 212346 214398,4 216450,8 
Cement consumption per capita 
(kg) 309,1 327,1 356,9 371,9 398,7 411,3 420,1 432,7 
Exchange Rate € 2,33 2,33 2,51 2,86 3,23 3,36 3,48 3,62 
Price change ex-inflation     0,60% -2,70% 0,70% 0,30% 0,10% 0,00% 
Inflation 5,04% 6,64% 5,40% 6,20% 5,92% 4,18% 4,37% 4,56% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 7564 8205 9260 10315 11369 12424 13479 14533 
Capacity Utilization 78% 78% 79% 77% 79% 78% 77% 74% 
Sales               
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 5900 6400 7314 7983 8962 9680 10342 10755 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)              210 BRL            224 BRL            237 BRL            245 BRL         262 BRL           273 BRL            286 BRL            299 BRL  
Concrete and Agregates 1600 2900 3314 3617 4061 4386 4686 4873 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne)                82 BRL               87 BRL               93 BRL               96 BRL         102 BRL           107 BRL            112 BRL            117 BRL  
Sales Revenues          1 370 BRL         1 687 BRL         2 044 BRL         2 305 BRL      2 761 BRL       3 116 BRL        3 478 BRL         3 781 BRL  
Other Revenues                73 BRL               90 BRL            109 BRL            123 BRL         147 BRL           166 BRL            186 BRL            202 BRL  
Total Revenues (10^6€)          1 443 BRL         1 777 BRL         2 153 BRL         2 428 BRL      2 908 BRL       3 282 BRL        3 664 BRL         3 983 BRL  
Cash-costs          1 092 BRL         1 344 BRL         1 629 BRL         1 837 BRL      2 200 BRL       2 483 BRL        2 772 BRL         3 013 BRL  
EBITDA              351 BRL            433 BRL            524 BRL            591 BRL         708 BRL           799 BRL            892 BRL            970 BRL  
DA                   - BRL                  - BRL            124 BRL            132 BRL         141 BRL           150 BRL            160 BRL            169 BRL  
EBIT              282 BRL            348 BRL            400 BRL            459 BRL         567 BRL           649 BRL            732 BRL            801 BRL  
Taxes                96 BRL            118 BRL            136 BRL            156 BRL         193 BRL           221 BRL            249 BRL            272 BRL  
WC              205 BRL            252 BRL            306 BRL            345 BRL         413 BRL           466 BRL            520 BRL            566 BRL  
IWC                   - BRL               47 BRL               53 BRL               39 BRL            68 BRL             53 BRL              54 BRL              45 BRL  
 
Appendix XLV: Forecasted Cash Flows (InterCement) 
Argentina 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Population (10^3) 41343 41760,8 42178,6 42596,4 43014,2 43432 43821,4 44210,8 
Cement consumption per capita (kg) 249,3 268,0333333 281,5666667 288,6333333 299,7 305,233333 309,4333333 317,0333333 
Exchange Rate € 5,20 5,76 5,85 7,27 11,39 15,48 19,89 25,63 
Price change ex-inflation     0,60% -2,70% 0,70% 0,30% 0,10% 0,00% 
Inflation 10,46% 9,78% 10,04% 10,62% 10,99% 12,00% 10,44% 8,88% 
Installed Capacity (10^3 tonne) 7051,282051 7820,512821 8237 8654 9071 9488 9905 10322 
Capacity Utilization 78% 78% 79% 77% 77% 76% 75% 74% 
Sales 2164,576298 2798,493874             
Cement and Clinker (10^3 tonne) 5500 6100 6472 6700 7025 7225 7390 7638 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne) $ 350,00 $ 384,21 $ 425,34 $ 457,80 $ 511,69 $ 574,81 $ 635,45 $ 691,88 
Concrete and Agregates 2000 2100 2228 2307 2419 2487 2544 2630 
Unit price (per 10^3 tonne) $ 136,65 $ 150,01 $ 166,06 $ 178,74 $ 199,77 $ 224,42 $ 248,10 $ 270,13 
Sales Revenues $ 2 198,30 $ 2 658,71 $ 3 122,82 $ 3 479,65 $ 4 077,98 $ 4 710,93 $ 5 326,95 $ 5 995,24 
Other Revenues $ 117,35 $ 141,93 $ 166,71 $ 185,76 $ 217,70 $ 251,49 $ 284,37 $ 320,05 
Total Revenues (10^6€) $ 2 315,65 $ 2 800,64 $ 3 289,53 $ 3 665,41 $ 4 295,67 $ 4 962,42 $ 5 611,32 $ 6 315,29 
Cash-costs $ 1 751,90 $ 2 118,82 $ 2 488,68 $ 2 773,05 $ 3 249,88 $ 3 754,30 $ 4 245,23 $ 4 777,82 
EBITDA $ 563,75 $ 681,82 $ 800,84 $ 892,35 $ 1 045,79 $ 1 208,11 $ 1 366,09 $ 1 537,48 
DA $ 110,76 $ 133,96 $ 263,29 $ 291,57 $ 324,14 $ 361,52 $ 405,68 $ 453,04 
EBIT $ 452,99 $ 547,87 $ 537,56 $ 600,79 $ 721,66 $ 846,59 $ 960,41 $ 1 084,44 
Taxes $ 113,25 $ 136,97 $ 134,39 $ 150,20 $ 180,41 $ 211,65 $ 240,10 $ 271,11 
WC $ 328,97 $ 397,87 $ 467,32 $ 520,72 $ 610,26 $ 704,98 $ 797,17 $ 897,18 
IWC $ 0,00 $ 68,90 $ 69,45 $ 53,40 $ 89,54 $ 94,72 $ 92,19 $ 100,01 
 




Appendix XLVII: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
Argentina 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 7820,51 8237,47 8654,42 9071,37 9488,33 9905,28 10322,24 
Inflation 9,8% 10,0% 10,6% 11,0% 12,0% 10,4% 8,9% 
gross PPP 6 067 559 6 719 307 7 469 862 8 331 490 9 349 190 10 440 427 11 589 280 
Acumulated Dep 3 625 939 3 889 225 4 180 793 4 504 928 4 866 452 5 272 137 5 725 173 
Net assets 2 441 620 2 830 082 3 289 070 3 826 561 4 482 738 5 168 290 5 864 107 
D&A   263 286 291 567 324 136 361 524 405 684 453 036 
CAPEX 629 961 548 252 637 168 741 293 868 409 1 001 217 1 136 012 
 
 
Appendix XLVIII: Depreciations and CAPEX (local currency) 
Brazil 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Installed Capacity 8205,13 9259,83 10314,53 11369,23 12423,93 13478,63 14533,32 
Inflation 6,6% 5,4% 6,2% 5,9% 4,2% 4,4% 4,6% 
gross PPP 2 855 283 3 041 874 3 249 680 3 467 614 3 675 821 3 898 208 4 135 849 
Acumulated Dep 1 706 301 1 830 199 1 962 193 2 103 205 2 253 673 2 413 176 2 582 329 
Net assets 1 148 982 1 211 675 1 287 487 1 364 410 1 422 148 1 485 032 1 553 520 
D&A   123 898 131 994 141 012 150 468 159 503 169 153 
CAPEX 296 448 251 055 296 999 346 755 394 762 446 990 503 945 
 
 
Appendix XLIX: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Argentina 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 5,85 7,27 11,39 15,48 19,89 25,63  
EBITDA 137 € 123 € 92 € 78 € 69 € 60 €   
Taxes 23 € 21 € 16 € 14 € 12 € 11 €   
IWC 12 € 7 € 8 € 6 € 5 € 4 €   
CAPEX 94 € 88 € 65 € 56 € 50 € 44 €   
FCFF 8 € 7 € 3 € 2 € 2 € 1 € 13 € 
Discounting Factor 0,8886 0,7896 0,7017 0,6235 0,5541 0,4924 0,4375 
PV 7 € 6 € 2 € 1 € 1 € 1 € 6 € 
EV 24 €             
 
Appendix L: Assets' Valuation (M€) 
Brazil 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 2,51 2,86 3,23 3,36 3,48 3,62  
EBITDA 209 € 206 € 219 € 238 € 256 € 268 €   
Taxes 54 € 54 € 60 € 66 € 72 € 75 €   
IWC 21 € 14 € 21 € 16 € 16 € 13 €   
CAPEX 100 € 104 € 107 € 118 € 128 € 139 €   
FCFF 33 € 35 € 31 € 39 € 41 € 41 € 813 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9215 0,8492 0,7825 0,7211 0,6645 0,6123 0,5643 
PV 31 € 29 € 24 € 28 € 27 € 25 € 459 € 








Appendix LI: Cimpor Valuation (M€) 
EV 5 496 € 
Adjusted Net Debt 1623 
Equity Value 3 873 € 
Number of shares 674 
Price per share 5,74 € 
 
 
Appendix LII: InterCement Valuation (M€) 
EV 647 € 
Adjusted Net Debt 768 
Equity Value -121 € 
 
 
Appendix LIII: NewCo Valuation (M€) 
  EV Merged entity without synergies 
Argentina 25 € 
Brazil IC 741 € 
Brazil cimpor 1 533 € 
Portugal 719 € 
Spain 231 € 
Egypt 460 € 
Morocco 557 € 
Tunisia 172 € 
Turkey 321 € 
Mozambique 251 € 
South Africa 547 € 
India 101 € 
China 444 € 
Cape Verde 48 € 
TOTAL 6 150 € 
 
Appendix LIV: NewCo Brazil's Valuation (without synergies) (M€) 
Brazil 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 2,51 2,86 3,23 3,36 3,48 3,62  
EBITDA 425 € 420 € 446 € 484 € 521 € 545 €   
Taxes 114 € 114 € 123 € 135 € 146 € 152 €   
IWC 44 € 26 € 40 € 30 € 30 € 24 €   
CAPEX 179 € 184 € 189 € 206 € 224 € 242 €   
FCFF 87 € 96 € 93 € 113 € 122 € 127 € 2 991 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9284 0,8619 0,8002 0,7429 0,6897 0,6404 0,5945 
PV 81 € 82 € 74 € 84 € 84 € 81 € 1 778 € 
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Appendix LV: NewCo Brazil's Valuation (with synergies) (M€) 
Brazil 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Terminal Value 
Exchange Rate 2,51 2,86 3,23 3,36 3,48 3,62  
EBITDA 442 € 437 € 464 € 504 € 543 € 567 €   
Taxes 120 € 120 € 130 € 142 € 153 € 160 €   
IWC 44 € 26 € 40 € 30 € 30 € 24 €   
CAPEX 179 € 184 € 189 € 206 € 224 € 242 €   
FCFF 99 € 107 € 105 € 126 € 136 € 142 € 3 343 € 
Discounting Factor 0,9284 0,8619 0,8002 0,7429 0,6897 0,6404 0,5945 
PV 92 € 92 € 84 € 94 € 94 € 91 € 1 988 € 




Appendix LVI: Cimpor Valuation 
with Synergies  (M€) 
EV 5 765 € 
Adjusted Net Debt 1623 
Equity Value 4 142 € 
Number of shares 674 
Price per share 6,14 € 
 
